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INTRODUCTION
The constitutional and legal parameters of positive measures to achieve
equality, especially through the medium of employment equity plans, have
been hotly contested in law and politics. The recent Constitutional Court
judgment of South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 (6) SA123
(CC) (‘Barnard’) might have established legal precedent, but it will do little to
quell this debate. On the contrary, its four judgments are likely to enhance
discussion about the implementation of employment equity or afﬁrmative
action in the workplace and the correct interpretation and justiﬁcation of
positive measures, and of substantive equality and dignity, in our democracy.
A decade ago, the case of Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121
(CC) (‘Van Heerden’) conﬁrmed the place of positive measures in our
equality jurisprudence as an integral part of, rather than an exception to,
substantive equality. In constitutional terms, positive measures should not be
subject to the test of presumptive fairness for discrimination under s 9(3), but
should be evaluated against the three criteria established in s 9(2). In this way,
they are subject to an evaluation of purpose and effects, guided by the values
underpinning the right, but with a thumb on the scale of overcoming
disadvantage, rather than the impact on individual dignity. Interestingly, this
conceptual framework was never fully applied to afﬁrmative action measures
under the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (‘the Act’), which tended to
be tested solely as unfair discrimination under s 6(1) of the Act. One of the
most disappointing outcomes of Barnard, as I argue below, is the failure of the
Constitutional Court to develop a common understanding for evaluating
employment-related afﬁrmative action under the Act, within the overall
normative framework of substantive equality established in s 9 of the
Constitution.
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Of course, the development of a constitutionally informed legal standard
to test employment equity plans and afﬁrmative action measures will always
be troubled in a country that has seen racial classiﬁcation serve as the basis for
oppression and subordination, and now seeks to use it to achieve a
‘non-racial’ democracy. Contestation over how to secure redress, restitution
and substantive equality is inevitable. The Barnard judgment demonstrates a
common commitment to restitution and transformation, and, indeed, a
common outcome. However, between that commitment and the outcome
lie important differences in philosophical and legal approaches to equality, to
s 9 of the Constitution and s 6 of the Act (and the relationship between
them), to the methods and standards of justiﬁcation for positive measures,
and to the need for courts to engage substantively with crucial issues in our
democracy. In this note, after setting out the case history and judgments in
some detail, I explore the contrasting ideas of equality that underpin the
different approaches to positive measures and discuss which is best suited to
our constitutional project. I argue for a multifaceted approach to equality in
s 9, which recognises the multiplicity of values that underlie the right, and
suggest that this normative framework allows courts to balance the reasons/
purpose for an equity decision and its impact/effects, in the light of the
competing and complementary values and principles that underlie equality.
I suggest that this approach provides an effective conceptual framework for
adjudicating employment equity decisions under the Act.
The implementation of afﬁrmative action measures, including equity
plans, generally involves employment decisions and can be challenged in
court as claims of unfair discrimination under s 6(1) of the Act. However,
such claims should be defended and adjudicated in terms of s 6(2)(a) of the
Act. In doing so, the conceptual and value framework established by the
place of s 9(2) in the right as a whole, as well as the relevant provisions of the
Act, should guide the process of justifying the equity decision, and balancing
its purpose and reasons against its effects. Although all the judgments in
Barnard seek to evaluate purpose and effects in the context of the constitu-
tional values of dignity and equality, I suggest that no single judgment gets it
exactly right, namely to interpret and apply the Act with due regard to the
complex, normative framework of substantive equality in the Constitution,
and especially in s 9.
CONTEXT AND FACTS
The legal saga of Barnard has always been about more than bare facts and
conﬂicting legal decisions. At its heart are anxieties about the place of racial
quotas, targets and representivity in the implementation of afﬁrmative action.
The applicant, Solidarity, is a registered trade union, publicly committed to
‘interven[ing] on behalf of people who are being unfairly disadvantaged by
afﬁrmative action’:
‘Solidarity believes that imbalances must be rectiﬁed without creating new
forms of imbalance. The manner in which afﬁrmative action is currently being
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implemented is creating serious new forms of discrimination. Because of the
ideology of representation the masses do not beneﬁt and whites are being
seriously disadvantaged.’ (Available at https://solidariteit.co.za/en/wat-maak-
solidariteit-uniek/, accessed on 22 October 2014)
Conceptually and politically, Solidarity is suspicious of positive measures and
views afﬁrmative action as a form of unfair discrimination that should always
be rigorously justiﬁed. Its members — whites and members of minority
groups who are unable to attain jobs or promotion because of equity targets
— are perceived to be ‘victims’of afﬁrmative action.
Ms Barnard was assisted by Solidarity in her claim of unfair race
discrimination against the SouthAfrican Police Service (‘the SAPS’) after she
was twice overlooked for promotion in circumstances where she was the
top-ranking applicant and where, despite the presence of an apparently
suitable black candidate, the position was not subsequently ﬁlled (a factor
that, according to her, affected service delivery).
In brief: Ms Barnard applied for the promotion position of superintendent
in the National Evaluation Services Unit of the SAPS in September 2005,
and, although a white woman, was recommended as the top applicant by a
racially diverse panel who had concluded that the second in line, a black
male, could not be appointed ‘without compromising service delivery’ (para
8). Given the under-representation of black women and men at that level,
the Divisional Commissioner declined to appoint for reasons of employment
equity (para 9). A similar post was advertised in May 2006 and Ms Barnard
again applied. Again, she was recommended and the panel noted that she
‘would not enhance representivity at salary level 9 but would not aggravate
the racial representivity of the division either as she was already part of the
division’ (para 12). It was noted further that her promotion would enhance
representivity at level 8, where there was an over-representation of white
women (ibid). This time, the Divisional Commissioner agreed to appoint
her, believing that her appointment would ‘enhance service delivery’ and a
failure to appoint her in the second round would ‘foster the wrong
impression’ (para 13). Nonetheless, the National Commissioner, who made
the ﬁnal decision, did not conﬁrm her appointment as the recommendation
did not ‘address the requirement of representivity and . . . the post was not
critical to service delivery’ (para 14). When the post was advertised for the
third time, as directed by the National Commissioner, Ms Barnard did not
apply.
Ms Barnard ﬁled a complaint in accordance with the SAPS’s grievance
procedure, and was given reasons that reiterated the issues of representivity
and service delivery, and spoke of restructuring the position in an attempt to
address representivity (paras 15–16). Dissatisﬁed with these, she proceeded to
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation andArbitration and then to the
Labour Court, the Labour Appeal Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and
the Constitutional Court. In this trail of judgments, the lack of clarity and
consensus in the interpretation and evaluation of positive measures and
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afﬁrmative action in the Constitution and the Act became ever more
apparent.
THE CONTRASTING JUDGMENTS OF THE LABOUR COURT,
LABOUR APPEAL COURT AND SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL:
FAIRNESS UNDER s 6(1) OF THE ACT OR RATIONALITY
UNDER s 9(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION?
The nub of Ms Barnard’s complaint was that she had been unfairly
discriminated against on the basis of race under s 6(1) of the Act. This
discrimination lay not in the content of the SAPS’s employment equity plan,
but in its implementation, and especially in the decision of the National
Commissioner not to appoint her because she was white. The Labour Court
disposed of the matter entirely on this basis, ﬁnding against the SAPS on the
ground that it had not discharged the onus of showing, on the balance of
probabilities, that the discrimination was not unfair (Solidarity obo Barnard v
South African Police Services (2010) 31 ILJ 742 (LC)).
On appeal to the Labour Appeal Court, the focus shifted to the status of
the SAPS Employment Equity Plan as a restitutionary measure envisaged by
s 9(2) of the Constitution, and enabled by the Employment Equity Act. In
other words, the balance shifted from a concern with the individual impact of
employment equity (as unfair discrimination) to whether the Plan and its
implementation were constitutionally and legally defensible (South African
Police Services v Solidarity obo Barnard 2013 (3) BCLR 320 (LAC) paras 17, 20).
The Labour Appeal Court noted that afﬁrmative action measures do not
constitute unfair discrimination under s 6(2)(a) of the Act, but should be
evaluated as ‘a constitutionally mandated tool in a designated employer’s
hands to ensure compliance with the injunction to ensure and achieve
equitable employment practices and representivity’ (para 34). Here the test is
whether there is
‘a rational connection between the transformational goal of promoting the
achievement of equality by ensuring equitable representation of designated
groups in all occupational categories and levels in the appellant’s workforce on
the one hand and the means to achieve that goal on the other’ (para 44).
The Labour Appeal Court found that the Commissioner was rationally
pursuing the goal of representivity in declining to appoint Ms Barnard and,
although representivity could be superseded by service delivery concerns,
there was insufﬁcient evidence for the court to ‘second-guess’ the National
Commissioner on this issue (para 46).
The conﬂicting judgments of the two courts — an emphasis on the impact
on individual rights and fairness in s 6 of the Act or the constitutionality of
implementing the plan determined by rationality under s 9 of the Constitu-
tion — set the stage for the appeal to the Supreme Court ofAppeal (Solidarity
obo Barnard v South African Police Services 2014 (2) SA 1 (SCA)). The Supreme
Court of Appeal deﬁned its normative approach at the outset, noting that
‘[i]n redressing the skewed situation created by our racist past, and to
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recalibrate and achieve a balanced society, there has to be an accommodation
and a scrupulous adherence to fairness’ (para 1). It located the case within an
overall understanding of substantive equality, restitution, reparation and the
creation of a ‘non-racial, non-sexist egalitarian society underpinned by
human dignity, the rule of law, a democratic ethos and human rights’ (para
10, quoting from Van Heerden). Honing in on theAct, the court accepted the
importance of employment equity plans to ‘overcome historical obstacles
and disadvantages and provid[e] equal opportunities for all’, but cautioned
against ‘the mechanical application of formulae and numerical targets’ (para
23). It judged the matter squarely within the determination of unfair
discrimination under s 6 of the Act and the onus established in s 11 (para 50)
and proceeded to engage in a careful, contextual analysis of the matter,
subjecting the facts of the case to ‘close . . . and scrupulous scrutiny’ (para 58),
ultimately concluding that the decision of the National Commissioner not to
appoint Ms Barnard was unfair discrimination. Importantly, it found that the
SAPS had not discharged the onus of showing that the discrimination was
fair. Central to this judgment was the Supreme Court of Appeal’s contention
that the level of scrutiny of positive measures must be vigorous and fair,
especially as race classiﬁcations were central to ‘the grand apartheid design’
and should be used, of necessity, but with care, in building a fully inclusive
society (para 80).
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The court delivered a 114-page judgment, comprising a seven judge main
judgment penned by Moseneke ACJ, a three judge minority (concurring in
the outcome) of Cameron, Froneman and Majiedt JJ (‘Cameron et al JJ’), and
two single judgments (also agreeing with the outcome) written by Van der
Westhuizen J and Jafta J (in which MosenekeACJ concurred). On the face of
it, there is much agreement; they are, after all, ‘concurring’ judgments. All
judges accepted that s 9(2) is a pivotal mechanism for overcoming the legacy
of our past, and that positive, restitutionary measures are essential to equality
and reconciliation. All endorsed a ‘substantive’ understanding of equality.
Moreover, all agreed that Ms Barnard’s claim should not succeed, and that
the decision not to appoint her was justiﬁed. However, they differed quite
fundamentally in the conceptualisation of the claim, their understandings of
equality and its underlying principles, the level of scrutiny to be applied to
positive measures and the basis for such scrutiny, and hence the nature and
degree of justiﬁcation required for such measures. These vary between
rationality and reasonableness (main judgment and Jafta J), fairness under the
Act (Cameron et al JJ), and balancing purpose and impact under s 9(2) and
within the Constitution as a whole (Van der Westhuizen J). Given the
diversity and richness of these judgments, and the conversation that takes
place between them, it is worth setting each out in some detail.
THE MOSENEKE MAIN JUDGMENT
Moseneke ACJ placed the matter squarely within the ‘transformative
mission’ of the Constitution and the need ‘to take active steps to achieve
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substantive equality’ (para 29). In seeking the goal of a ‘more equal and fair
society that . . . is non-racial, non-sexist and socially inclusive’, he said that
care should be taken that ‘the steps taken to promote substantive equality do
not unwittingly infringe the dignity of other individuals’ (paras 30–2).
Following the judgment in Van Heerden, Moseneke ACJ stated that the test
for evaluating the constitutionality and lawfulness of positive measures,
including afﬁrmative action, is not ‘unfair discrimination’, but whether the
measure is defensible under s 9(2) of the Constitution and s 6(2) of the Act.
Of the Supreme Court ofAppeal judgment, he noted:
‘[T]he Court misconceived the issue before it as well as the controlling law. It
was obliged to approach the equality claim through the prism of s 9(2) of the
Constitution and s 6(2) of theAct.’ (para 51)
Afﬁrmative action measures should not be presumed to be suspect and unfair
(and thus subject to a Harksen analysis), but should be subject to the three
criteria derived from s 9(2), namely that they must: (i) ‘target a particular class
of people who have been susceptible to unfair discrimination’; (ii) ‘be
designed to promote or advance those classes of persons’; and (iii) ‘promote
the achievement of equality’ (paras 36–7).
Disappointingly, the judgment took three steps backward at this stage.
First, instead of developing this conceptual approach in relation to imple-
menting afﬁrmative action under the Act, Moseneke ACJ limited the ambit
of Van Heerden by setting a minimum rationality standard for evaluating
restitutionary measures: they ‘must be rationally related to the terms and
objects of the measure’ (para 39). Secondly, Moseneke ACJ failed to apply
s 9(2) to the facts at hand. Instead, he reinterpreted the claim as one ‘directed,
not at unfair discrimination based on race under section 6(1) of theAct, but at
reviewing and setting aside the National Commissioner’s decision not to
appoint her’ (para 59). This oddly formalistic side-step avoided a substantive
engagement with the problems of evaluating afﬁrmative action within an
overall understanding of employment law and substantive equality. Thirdly,
he found that the matter (as a claim for administrative review) was not
properly before the court, and concluded that ‘this belated attempt to . . .
review . . . the National Commissioner’s decision must fail’ (para 60).
The judgment concluded with reasons as to why, even if the court were
‘benevolently to entertain the review, it is without merit’ (ibid). First, the
appointment fell squarely within the discretion of the National Commis-
sioner, and he was lawfully entitled to decline to appoint Ms Barnard for
reasons of representivity (para 62). Secondly, there was no basis to believe
that service delivery would be affected by Ms Barnard’s non-appointment
(paras 63–4). Thirdly, in preferring representivity over Ms Barnard’s compe-
tence, the decision was not unreasonable. It is in this last nod to reasonable-
ness that the court balances the quest for representivity against the impact on
Ms Barnard, ﬁnding that it did not constitute an ultimate bar on her
advancement and that Ms Barnard knew about, and accepted, the targets
under the Employment Equity Plan (paras 65–8).
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THE CAMERON MINORITY, CONCURRING JUDGMENT
Justices Cameron, Froneman and Majiedt concurred in the main judgment’s
articulation of the constitutional values that underlie restitutionary measures
and in its outcome, but write separately to (i) emphasise the racial tensions
that ‘accompany the formulation and implementation of restitutionary
measures’; and (ii) identify the appropriate standard for deciding when a
restitutionary measure is ‘constitutionally compliant’ (paras 74–5). In contrast
to the main judgment’s characterisation of the claim as an administrative
review of the National Commissioner’s decision, the judges deﬁned the ‘core
issue’ of the litigation to be a claim of unfair discrimination which required
them to ‘mediate the tension between th[e] prohibition [of unfair discrimi-
nation] and the Act’s recognition that afﬁrmative action measures are
justiﬁed, and to formulate a robust, constitutionally compliant standard by
which to adjudicate Ms Barnard’s claim’ (para 82).
Expanding on the ‘transformative tensions’ that accompany restitutionary
measures, the judges identiﬁed a concern (also present in the Supreme Court
of Appeal) with the use of race as a category to redress the past, whilst
building an inclusive society that is not deﬁned by race, and the tensions that
this might create between ‘the equality entitlement of an individual and the
equality of society as a whole’ (para 77). In resolving these tensions, the
judges warn against using race as ‘the only decisive factor in employment
decisions’ (para 80), and seek a more ﬂexible and multifaceted standard that
would enable them to balance competing constitutional values. In doing so,
they rejected the main judgment’s adoption of a rationality standard: ‘The
important constitutional values that can be in tension when a decision-maker
implements remedial measures require a court to examine this implementa-
tion with a more exacting standard of scrutiny’ (para 95). A rationality
standard, they argued, is too deferential in that it would generally prevent a
court from determining when ‘a decision-maker had impermissibly con-
verted a set of numerical targets into quotas’ (para 96). ‘Any decision that
accords with numerical targets would bear at least some rational connection
with the measure’s legitimate representivity goals’ and thus pass constitu-
tional muster (ibid). For them, this would be an undue elevation of race
(representivity) over other concerns. These concerns include the impact on
the dignity of the person(s) adversely affected, as well as the need to balance
the position and interests of multiple designated groups (ibid).
Unlike the main judgment’s focus on s 9(2) of the Constitution and Van
Heerden for guidance, Cameron et al JJ seek to ‘formulate a standard speciﬁc
to the Act’ that is rigorous enough to balance the purposes of the Act with the
interests of all affected (paras 84–5, 97). This, they decide, is fairness — a
ﬂexible and open-ended norm (familiar in labour law) that can be developed
as precedent is established. For them, fairness applies in two ways to
afﬁrmative action measures: ﬁrst, the measures must meet the standard of fair
discrimination; and secondly, the implementation of the measures must meet
the standards of fairness developed for that purpose (para 101). Again, this
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contrasts with the main judgment’s averment that afﬁrmative action mea-
sures should be evaluated outside of the standard of unfair discrimination
(and presumptive fairness). By adopting this more rigorous standard, Cam-
eron et al JJ open to scrutiny the reasons given by the National Commis-
sioner for his decision (para 102).
As the individual implementation of an employment equity plan is an
employment decision, the judges worked with the text of the Act and labour
law (rather than the Constitution) to identify criteria for determining
whether employment equity plans have been fairly implemented. These
criteria included the purpose of redressing disadvantage and achieving
equitable representation (s 2), as well as s 15, which speaks about the kinds of
measures that can be implemented as part of employment equity. For
example, these measures must be ﬂexible targets, rather than rigid quotas;
should further diversity and equal dignity and respect; should not constitute
an absolute barrier to employment; and should take account of merit (paras
87–90).
In evaluating the National Commissioner’s reasons, the judges focused on
two critical issues raised in the appointment process: Was an appointment
necessary for service delivery? Would the promotion of Ms Barnard have
addressed representivity? Overall, the question was whether the Commis-
sioner had adequately explained how he had balanced service delivery and
representivity (in respect of both race and gender), and had applied the Plan
in a ﬂexible and fair manner (to avoid the de facto conversion of numerical
target into rigid quotas). In weighing these issues, the judges found that the
Commissioner’s failure to give reasons for choosing representivity over
service delivery, and even to consider the issue of gender representivity, were
both indications that he had not implemented the Plan in a fair manner (paras
113, 120). Indeed, the Commissioner’s reasons, on their own, provided
limited evidence of the fair implementation of the Plan (para 121). In
contrast to the approach of the Labour Court and Supreme Court of Appeal,
Cameron et al JJ do not seem to adopt a presumptive idea of fairness that
shifts the onus to the employer/state to dispose of the matter. Thus they
consider ‘the absence of proper challenge and argument’ in Ms Barnard’s case
on issues of service delivery, gender representivity, the Plan, and its targets, as
a critical factor in tipping the scales in favour of the decision-maker’s stated
reasons (para 122). To this ‘close call’ in deciding that there was fair
implementation, they note that the over-representation of white women at
salary scale 9 justiﬁed a preference for racial representivity, and Ms Barnard’s
eventual promotion suggested that the non-appointment did not constitute
an absolute barrier to her advancement in the SAPS. These factors mitigated
in favour of the interpretation of numerical targets as ‘permissible goals and
not as impermissible quotas’ (para 123).
THE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN JUDGMENT
Justice van der Westhuizen’s insightful judgment engages the main judgment
and the Cameron judgment. He differed from them in constructing the
(2015) 132 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL718
JOBNAME: SALJ 15 Part4 PAGE: 9 SESS: 33 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 17 13:15:30 2015
/first/Juta/juta/SALJ−2015−Part4/00notes
matter, not as an as administrative review or application of the Act, but as an
evaluation of a s 9(2) measure in accordance with the standard set in Van
Heerden. Van der Westhuizen J was particularly concerned that in developing
and implementing ‘measures to restructure . . . society, heal [our] country
and promote dignity and equality’ (para 128), there is a sense of ‘an integrated
project to achieve equality, within the context of the . . . Constitution [as a
whole], our history and the [non-racial, non-sexist and socially inclusive]
future of which we dream’ (para 130). In particular, he sought to develop a
balance between the individual impact of positive measures, the need to
achieve substantive equality, and the dignity of both Ms Barnard and ‘those
humiliated by apartheid’ (para 131). His approach, therefore, was to identify
two constitutional bases for evaluating the implementation of positive
measures: (i) the s 9(2) test and, especially, its third leg of ‘advancing equality’
(para 146); and (ii) an assessment of ‘whether the impact of the implementa-
tion of a section 9(2) measure on other rights is more severe than is necessary
to achieve its purpose’ (para 164).
Turning to s 9, Van der Westhuizen J conﬁrmed that positive measures are
integral to a coherent understanding of substantive equality (paras 135–9). In
determining the extent to which the implementation of positive measures
may be scrutinised by courts, he drew from the Van Heerden test. Once a
measure has been evaluated for constitutionality in terms of all three criteria
and ‘is found to fall within section 9(2) and . . . not unfair discrimination
under section 9(3), the effect and impact of its implementation must be
evaluated’ (para 145). In doing so, more than ‘mere abstract rational testing is
required’, especially as the third Van Heerden criterion, the need to ‘promote
equality’, suggests that the impact of the measure must be evaluated (para 146,
my emphasis). Van der Westhuizen J drew out several factors from this. First,
the implementation of the measure should not involve ‘abuse of power or
impos[ition of] . . . a substantial and undue harm on those excluded from its
beneﬁts’ (para 147, quoting Van Heerden). More broadly, however, the
enquiry should ‘take into account whether the measure undermines the goal
of s 9 to promote the long-term vision of a society based on non-racialism
and non-sexism and must be alive to shifting circumstances and the
distribution of privilege and under-privilege in society’ (para 148). In seeking
equality, more than demographic representivity is required, especially when
this results in small numerical targets that exclude persons from consideration
and thus ‘may unjustly ignore the hardships or disadvantages suffered by the
candidate or category of person, not to mention . . . [their] qualiﬁcations,
experience and ability’ (para 149). In addition, one should not aggravate
inequality — in this case by worsening the over-representation of a group
(para 150).
In applying the criterion of ‘achieving equality’ to the decision not to
appoint Ms Barnard, or anyone at all, Van der Westhuizen J considered
several factors. First, the decision avoided aggravating over-representation
and inequality on the basis of race (a corollary of promoting equality).
Secondly, the Employment Equity Plan paid attention to the intersectional
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position of white women as a group, but sought to avoid an existing
over-representation of white women at the particular salary level. Thirdly,
the failure to appoint anyone was not relevant to the decision not to appoint
Ms Barnard and could not be used to render it unlawful (paras 150–6).
However, he found that the enquiry did not end there, as attention had to
be paid to other constitutional rights and values. Here Van der Westhuizen J
sought to identify a constitutional basis for balancing a potentially prejudicial
impact of the decision on the affected individual, against the equality
justiﬁcations of the decision-maker (sourced in s 9(2)). This is possible under
‘fairness’ in the s 9(3) (unfair discrimination) enquiry, but Van der Westhui-
zen J correctly noted that to apply ‘fairness’ to s 9(2) risked ‘internal
inconsistency’ (para 158). He reminded us of the precedent set in Van
Heerden, that s 9(2) provides a complete defence against unfair discrimina-
tion, and that courts would rightly be reluctant to second-guess policies that
clear Van Heerden standards and are thus not unfair (para 160). Van der
Westhuizen J thus posed a further enquiry, namely, ‘whether the impact of
the implementation of a section 9(2) measure on other rights is more severe
than is necessary to achieve its purpose’ (para 164). This drew from the
proportionality analysis of s 36, and required the court to ‘engage in a
balancing exercise and arrive at global judgment on proportionality and not
adhere mechanically to a sequential checklist’ (ibid). It involved a ‘case-
sensitive and concrete assessment of competing rights’ in which a ‘right or
value is not compromised more than is necessary, in the context of a
constitutional state founded on dignity, equality and freedom in which
government has positive duties to uphold such values’ (para 166). In the
present case, Van der Westhuizen J identiﬁed as signiﬁcant not only rights to
human dignity, but also the constitutional values around service delivery and
accountability.
The potential of afﬁrmative action to impair dignity is present in the
emphasis of one’s race, gender or disability over other attributes; an emphasis
that could amount to ‘a substantial and undue harm’ (para 168). How then do
we measure dignity harms in relation to afﬁrmative action? Van der
Westhuizen J distinguished a narrow and subjective notion of dignity as an
infringement of dignitas or self-esteem from the idea of being treated, more
generally, with equal concern and respect (paras 170–2). Here the focus is not
on an atomised individual, but on the ‘collective impulses’ of dignity and
ubuntu, our ‘interdependence as members of a community’ (para 174).
Afﬁrmative action measures should be evaluated not only in terms of their
impact on a single individual, but on how they enhance the dignity of society
as a whole (paras 175–6). In this instance, we need to consider the
importance of positive measures and afﬁrmative action to restoring the
dignity of those affected by apartheid (paras 177–8). This means weighing
individual against collective dignity and the goal of substantive equality. In
considering whether the impact on Ms Barnard’s dignity was reasonable and
justiﬁable in the light of the goal of substantive equality (in this case equitable
representation in the SAPS), Van der Westhuizen J asked whether she was
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treated as a means to an end and her place in society denigrated (para 180).
Related to this was whether the non-appointment ‘amount[ed] to an
absolute barrier to her advancement’. He found neither to be the case as a
result of the over-representation of her group and the ﬂexibility in the Plan
which allowed her to be promoted to another position (para 182).
Finally, the judge weighed ideas of personal integrity and an efﬁcient
public service against the promotion of equality (as representivity). In the
end, understanding the effects of a policy, appointment or vacancy on service
delivery is a complex balance that requires evidence and specialist institu-
tional knowledge. Van der Westhuizen J found that there was insufﬁcient
evidence to make a call in this case, and deferred to the Commissioner’s
decision (paras 187–9).
THE JAFTA CONCURRING JUDGMENT
Justice Jafta agreed with, and extended, the main judgment and, in particular,
the ﬁnding that the cause of action had developed into a review of the
National Commissioner’s decision that was not on the papers and should not
have been considered.
To the extent that he made comments, obiter, on the appropriate standard
to be applied to implementing positive measures, Jafta J also opposed the
fairness threshold identiﬁed by Cameron et al JJ. However, he did agree with
their instinct to ﬁnd a standard within the Act. He suggested that the
evaluation of afﬁrmative action measures, and their implementation, must
take place in terms of s 6(2) of the Act, namely, that they must be consistent
with the purpose of the Act. Here he conﬁned his reading of purpose to s 2 of
the Act and rejectd Cameron et al JJ’s use of other sections of the Act.
Accordingly, he limited the enquiry to whether the purpose of equitable
representation was met, to the exclusion of considerations of impact and
other effects (paras 224–7). For him, an approach that requires courts to take
account of ‘competing interests’ and ‘weigh the interests of the claimant
against those of the class the restitutionary measure was adopted to advance,
as well as the interests of an employer who is obliged by the Act to achieve
equity’ would undermine the very objectives of s 9(2) of the Constitution
and the Act (paras 228–9). At its foundation, this argument — together with
that of the Labour Appeal Court which Jafta J cited with approval —
prioritises redress and restitution in the achievement of equality. The only
standard that the decision-maker must meet is that he or she must rationally
aim to achieve ‘representivity and equity’ (para 227).
ANALYSIS
The judgments raise many issues. At the centre of these is the absence of a
common, coherent and holistic interpretation of positive measures and
afﬁrmative action within a broad understanding of (substantive) equality.
Rather, the judgments express contrasting approaches to racial transforma-
tion and positive measures, and grapple with different ways of giving
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expression to these in law. Yet, all judgments address — and seek to evaluate
— the same underlying issues concerning the purpose of and reasons for the
decision, and its impact on Ms Barnard, and all agree that Ms Barnard cannot
succeed in her claim. Surprisingly, the application of different legal standards
makes no difference to the result. For the main judgment (and Jafta J), the
greater emphasis on rationality allowed a measure of deference to the
National Commissioner. But even on the majority’s alternative reasonable-
ness standard, the claim failed (paras 65–70). Cameron et al JJ and Van der
Westhuizen J sought, in different ways, to balance goals of restitution and
representivity against considerations of individual impact and service deliv-
ery, with reference to particular understandings of the values of dignity and
substantive equality (see further below). Whilst Cameron et al JJ relied on a
notion of fairness to evaluate competing concerns, Van derWesthuizen J used
a value-based framework of proportionality drawn from s 36 of the Consti-
tution to evaluate whether the decision was ‘reasonable and justiﬁable’ and,
in particular, ‘whether the impact of the implementation of a section 9(2)
measure on other rights is more severe than is necessary to achieve its
purpose’ (para 164). In the end, the call made in both judgments is inﬂuenced
by limited information, and both cite a paucity of evidence and argumenta-
tion on both sides as factors in the result (see for example paras 122, 187–9).
By contrast, the Supreme Court of Appeal (working within a framework of
unfair discrimination) engaged the evidence on record in much ﬁner detail,
insisting that the SAPS bear the onus of providing evidence of fairness, and
concluding that the scarcity of this evidence and the failure of the National
Commissioner properly to explain the non-appointment meant that the
discrimination was unfair.
The Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court judgments
illustrate the differences between the close scrutiny of impact in a fairness
approach (required by s 9(3) of the Constitution and s 6(1) of the Act), with
its attendant onus, on the one hand, and the more deferent approach of
rationality, the operation of fairness, without an operative onus, or propor-
tionality guided by substantive equality and ‘collective dignity’ on the other.
Yet, while the Constitutional Court set a clear precedent that one should not
adjudicate positive employment measures as a matter of discrimination and
presumptive fairness, it did not reach consensus on the constitutional
framework required by s 9 and its inﬂuence on the Act. In the end, therefore,
the case sets little detailed precedent. The judgment as a whole remains
open-ended and contested, its failure to carve out a common constitutional
standard creating uncertainty in an area that is in dire need of clear precedent.
What precedent does Barnard set?
What does the case tell us about the evaluation of positive measures in the
workplace? First, following the decision in Van Heerden, the case is (again)
clear precedent for the fact that the conceptual framework for evaluating the
state’s employment equity plans and afﬁrmative action measures, as well as
decisions taken in terms of them, starts with s 9(2) and not unfair discrimina-
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tion in s 9(3). Once more the court reminded us that positive measures are
subject to a different constitutional and legal standard than s 9(3) fairness.
Although this is not a direct precedent for private employers, it is likely that a
similar approach would apply to them. What remains undeveloped is a clear
understanding of what the correct conceptual framework is, what legal
standard applies, and what the relationship between s 9(2) and theAct is.
Secondly, in evaluating the content of employment equity plans and
afﬁrmative action measures by the state, the minimum standard is one of
rationality, but it is not the deﬁnitive standard.As I argue below, Van Heerden,
properly and generously read, clearly sets a higher standard and, as Moseneke
ACJ noted in the judgment, ‘these are minimum requirements, it is not
necessary to deﬁne the standard ﬁnally’ (para 39).
Thirdly, the standard for assessing the implementation of employment
equity plans and afﬁrmative action measures by the state remains undecided.
Whilst one could argue that the main judgment is precedent for the standard
of rationality, the judgment’s concern with the absence of legal argument on
the issue (see for example paras 54–60, 216) suggests that this, too, is open to
further consideration. Moreover, the application of administrative review to
an employment decision remains a matter of some controversy (see most
recently Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC)). Even if
the matter is open to administrative review, it must surely also be open to
challenge under the relevant labour law, as an employment decision (see also
Cameron et al JJ para 97). Here, it is clear, as three of the four judgments
stated, that (whilst it might be brought as a case of unfair discrimination) it
cannot be evaluated as an instance of unfair discrimination, or in terms of a
notion of ‘fairness’ (Moseneke ACJ paras 51–3; Van der Westhuizen J para
160; Jafta J paras 228–9). As discussed further below, I suggest that the
standard should be derived from a reading of s 9 that embraces a multi-
faceted notion of equality and enables different values and principles to guide
the balancing of purpose and effects in employment equity decisions.
The case does not, therefore, set a ﬁnal constitutional standard; provide a
deﬁnitive interpretation of the application of s 9(2) to employment-related
positive measures and employment equity; specify the relationship between
s 9 and the Act in these matters; or establish clarity on the idea of substantive
equality and its multiple underlying principles that would underpin a
coherent reading of s 9. Starting with the latter, it is to these points that I now
turn.
Contested ideas of (substantive) equality
The judgment reveals how the idea of (substantive) equality in s 9 remains
contested, and even undeveloped. Perhaps the most prominent debate in
equality jurisprudence has been the place of dignity in the equality right.
While there is signiﬁcant support in courts and academia for dignity to be the
‘lodestar for equality’, and for unfair discrimination to be measured by a
Kantian idea of equal moral worth (Laurie Ackermann Human Dignity: Lodestar
for Equality in South Africa (2013); S Woolman ‘Dignity’ in S Woolman,
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T Roux, J Klaaren, A Stein, M Chaskalson & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional
Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS, 2006)), this has been disputed in the literature
and in some judgments (Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt ‘Facing the
challenge of transformation: Difﬁculties in the development of an indigenous
jurisprudence of equality’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 248; D M Davis ‘Equality: The
majesty of Legoland jurisprudence’ (1999) 116 SALJ 398), and some have
argued for a more complex and multifaceted understanding of substantive
equality in which dignity is but one dimension (Albertyn & Goldblatt op cit;
Sandra Fredman ‘Redistribution and recognition: Reconciling inequalities’
(2007) 23 SAJHR 214; Henk Botha ‘Equality, plurality and structural power’
(2009) 25 SAJHR 1; Cathi Albertyn & Sandra Fredman ‘Equality beyond
dignity: Multi-dimensional equality and Justice Langa’s judgments’ 2015 Acta
Juridica 430).
The dignity-centred approach emerged in the development of unfair
discrimination under s 9(3). Here dignity serves two purposes. First, it
distinguishes between differential treatment under s 9(1), subject to a test of
rationality, and differential treatment under s 9(3) which amounts to discrim-
ination and is subject to the test of fairness. Differentiation amounts to
discrimination only when it takes place on grounds that have the potential to
impair dignity. Secondly, it is only when there is actual impairment of human
dignity that this discrimination is found to be unfair. Here the impact of the
impugned law or conduct on the dignity of the person complaining of
discrimination is determinative (Harksen v Lane NO & others 1998 (1) SA 300
(CC) para 53). So, dignity is pivotal to deciding unfair discrimination and is
here predominantly understood to connote inherent human worth and the
need to be treated as equally worthy and with equal concern and respect.
In dignity, the focus is on individual worth. However, a more group-based
approach to ‘socio-economic disadvantage’, that emanates from one’s mem-
bership of a disadvantaged group, is factored into the evaluation of fairness
(Harksen para 53). This idea of group-based disadvantage has roots in critical
rather than liberal theory, and generally refers to more systemic and
institutionalised group-based forms of inequality. However, in s 9(3) juris-
prudence, it is generally subsumed by the overall evaluation of impairment of
individual dignity as equal moral worth. It is thus often seen as an extension
of dignity, rather than a separate understanding of inequality, or an autono-
mous dimension of a more complex idea of inequality (Albertyn & Fredman
op cit at 436).
The problem with an equality approach based on the impact of an
impugned action on individual dignity as self-worth is that it leaves little
conceptual space to develop an understanding of positive measures that seek
to advance members of historically disadvantaged groups. If the impact on
the dignity of the individual complainant is determinative, and this is
enhanced by a presumption in favour of unfairness, how do you justify
positive measures that seek to redress collective disadvantage but also affect
individual members of other, usually more privileged, groups?
Both Cameron et al JJ and Van der Westhuizen J sought to address positive
measures by retaining the determining power of dignity. The former did so
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within a framework of equality (and s 9), while Van derWesthuizen J stepped
outside of this. Cameron et al JJ identiﬁed the need to develop a ‘standard to
determine whether the implementation of a remedial measure has adequately
balanced substantive equality with the dignity of the person negatively affected by
the measure’ (para 94, my emphasis). However, they gave little autonomous
normative content to substantive or restitutionary equality, and, in the end,
identiﬁed dignity as the deﬁning value in concluding that the equality goal of
afﬁrmative action is ‘equal dignity and respect of all’ — equal dignity and
respect both of those being advanced and those being affected by the measure
(para 89). Although it is not entirely clear (as they endorse Van der
Westhuizen J’s comments on dignity in note 107), Cameron et al JJ seem
only to be concerned with individual dignity (equal moral worth) rather than
following Van der Westhuizen J in balancing the ‘collective’ dignity of a
group versus the individual.
Although there is much to value in Cameron et al JJ’s judgment (especially
its instinct to develop a balanced constitutional standard), overall, its
conceptual prioritisation of individual dignity and its failure to develop the
idea of group disadvantage and substantive equality limits its capacity to reach
out to a richer, more coherent and complex understanding of equality and
positive measures within a holistic interpretation of s 9.
Van der Westhuizen J worked with dignity outside of equality and
balanced one against the other. For him s 9(2) focuses mostly on the nature of
the measure to achieve equality and whether or not, in general, it actually
achieves equality (paras 145–50). Here he initially poses an idea of substantive
equality that recognises group-based disparities and intersectional disadvan-
tage, and that seeks to undo the unequal distribution of power, privilege and
opportunities in society. Positive measures seek to redistribute opportunities,
and must do so in a nuanced, intersectional and situation-sensitive manner,
without imposing ‘substantial and undue harm’ (as illustrated by the analysis
in paras 150–5). At this stage, the idea of equality is deﬁned not by dignity,
but by achieving a more just distribution of power and resources. For Van der
Westhuizen J, dignity only enters the equation as a self-standing right which
must be weighed against the nature and scope of the equality measure. Thus
he sought to balance the value and right of equality (as positive measures)
against other rights and values, especially dignity (para 169).
In doing so, Van der Westhuizen J developed a dual understanding of
dignity which accepts the more dominant Kantian idea of dignity as intrinsic
worth and being treated with equal concern and respect (para 71), but also
speaks to a more collective understanding in which the well-being of each
person is connected to others and to the well-being of society as a whole
(para 175, drawing on Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505
(CC)), and especially those injured by apartheid (paras 170–6). Van der
Westhuizen J then sought to balance the dignity of the group versus the
dignity of the individual (paras 178–9), as well as the individual dignity
impact on Ms Barnard, against ‘the goal of substantive equality’ (paras
180–3). Here he no longer speaks of the distributive aims of equality (to
NOTES 725
JOBNAME: SALJ 15 Part4 PAGE: 16 SESS: 33 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 17 13:15:30 2015
/first/Juta/juta/SALJ−2015−Part4/00notes
redress inequality in the distribution of power and privilege), but of its
dignity aims: to ensure that people are equally valued and are treated with
equal concern and respect (para 180).
Although Van der Westhuizen J argued for ‘an integrated project to
achieve equality’ (para 130) and seemed to recognise that equality should be
developed as a coherent conceptual idea that enables different principles to
emerge and be developed, in practice he did not do this. He was alive to
redistribution and redress of disadvantage as an important component of
equality under s 9(2), but did not coherently relate this to other dimensions
of equality such as equal concern and respect. This is because he ended up
locating important components of equality outside of the right, within an
expanded notion of dignity, rather than accommodating multiple values and
interests within the equality right. By doing so, dignity becomes overloaded,
straining under the weight of its more dominant meaning of inherent human
worth and a more collective notion of group-based dignity. Equally
disconcerting is the fact that the discussion on the right to dignity almost
entirely derives from equality jurisprudence! It is clear that Van der Westhui-
zen J was seeking an effective way of balancing the various competing
considerations and values that are generated by the implementation of
afﬁrmative action. However, he seemed to end up with a dignity-centred
approach and missed a crucial opportunity to develop equality jurisprudence
— and the rich debates in Van Heerden — to strengthen the justiﬁcatory
mechanisms and resolution of the multiple purposes, principles and values
that underpin this complex right.
In the end, both judgments persisted in an approach in which dignity
continues to deﬁne equality, and a more complex idea of equality remains
undeveloped. The focus of equality (whether as fairness or as positive
measures) is on equal dignity as a mechanism of securing the equal status and
equal recognition of individuals, rather than more systemic, collective and
redistributive goals. By this I mean that positive measures seem to be justiﬁed
largely because of the indignity of apartheid and its failure to accord equal
recognition to persons, regardless of race, rather than by the concomitant
need to redistribute goods, resources and opportunities, or to overcome
systemic group-based oppression and subordination.
Elements of the main judgment seem to adopt an approach in which the
achievement of equality is informed by the need to overcome unequal power
relations and disadvantage, whilst being alert to the dignity of all (paras
28–32). Substantive equality is achieved, inter alia, by the taking of
restitutionary or afﬁrmative measures, but it is not equated with this (paras
33–5). Rather, it seems to be allied to the broader goal of achieving a
‘non-racial, non-sexist and socially inclusive society’ (para 32). There seems
to be an understanding that this does not merely imply equal concern and
respect (although dignity remains an important measure: para 31), but also
requires a collective understanding of group-based equality and the need for
systemic change that dislodges existing social and economic hierarchies and
power relations (see for example paras 29, 33, 35). However, this idea
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remains implicit and unarticulated as the judgment, disappointingly, does
little conceptual work in developing equality and defers to a rationality
standard in testing the claim.
In summary, therefore, all judgments lack a multifaceted understanding of
the purposes and principles of substantive equality that would have enabled a
clear and consistent development of s 9 equality jurisprudence. Such an
approach could have drawn on Van Heerden to provide greater clarity and
guidance on how to balance and justify the apparently competing claims of
discrimination and afﬁrmative action, both in s 9 and in theAct.
Substantive equality as a complex, coherent and multifaceted idea
In contrast to a dignity-centred approach, I argue for an understanding of s 9,
as a whole, that captures a complex, multi-dimensional right to substantive
equality, informed by a variety of constitutional principles and values. At
minimum, they include the democratic values of the achievement of
equality, dignity and freedom.
There is little space in this note to elucidate this idea or to give detailed
meaning to these values; however, the following content seems to ﬂow most
logically from the Constitution and its jurisprudence. The value of dignity
would generally concern recognition or social equality issues and signify a
concern with the equal social worth of individuals. The value of achieving
equality can be read to seek redress of structural disadvantage towards a more
just and egalitarian social and economic order (as a complex idea of
intersecting social and economic, distributive and relational inequalities:
Jonathan Wolff & Avner de-Shalit Disadvantage (2007)). The principle of
afﬁrming difference and diversity captured within s 9 is simultaneously an
incidence of individual self-worth and of removing the hierarchies of
privilege and power that impede group-based recognition — reﬂecting the
values of equality and dignity. The inﬂuence of the values of freedom and
participation on s 9 speaks to the ability of individuals to make choices and
secure their full place within society. This is closely linked to the value of
equality in so far as it requires undoing hierarchies of power and privilege and
establishing the social and economic conditions necessary for individual
well-being, positive relationships and meaningful choice. How each of these
is understood in a particular claim, as well as the relationship between them,
might differ (as the experience and conditions of inequality differ), but each
must be articulated contextually within an overall goal of promoting
individual well-being, enabling the conditions of greater equality, and
achieving a more just society. (See further on this multi-dimensional
approach Fredman op cit; Botha op cit; Catherine Albertyn ‘ ‘‘The stubborn
persistence of patriarchy’’: Gender equality and cultural diversity in South
Africa’ (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 165 at 184–94; Albertyn &
Fredman op cit.)
Overall, these values speak to a society which, inter alia, seeks to (i) accord
equal status and recognition to all and overcome the failure to treat
individuals with equal concern and respect; (ii) address the systemic and
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entrenched conditions of group-based disadvantage; (iii) afﬁrm difference
and diversity; and (iv) secure the conditions necessary for participation and
choice. Such an approach evinces a concern with the individual, but within a
deeper understanding that individual circumstances and choices are struc-
tured by intersectional and overlapping group-based systems of inequality.
Although s 9 is not the only right that aspires to create the society
described above, it plays a signiﬁcant role in addressing unfair discrimination
(the differences to which disadvantage attaches) and positive measures that
proactively remove or address the social and economic disadvantage that
attaches to race or gender (or other) difference. The multi-dimensional
approach to s 9 recognises that multiple, competing and complementary
principles and values inform the right as a whole, and might be differently
balanced in different sections of the right (such as s 9(2) versus s 9(3)) and in
different instances of inequality. A single value, such as dignity, is no longer
determinative. Rather, issues of individual dignity, for example, can be
weighed against group-based disadvantage within an overall understanding
of the kind of society that we are seeking to achieve. Unlike Van der
Westhuizen J’s approach, this is done within the ambit of s 9 and its animating
values. Courts are therefore expected to ﬁnd the appropriate balance
between dignity and disadvantage, between the individual (and her dignity)
and the (structural disadvantage of the) group, and between immediate harm
and long-term transformative goals. In particular, a greater emphasis needs to
be placed on developing ideas of remedying disadvantage and enhancing
participation in interpreting the right. The next section builds on Van Heerden
and Barnard to consider how this might be done in s 9 in general, and s 9(2) in
particular, as well as how this might inform the interpretation and application
of theAct.
Substantive equality, the Act and the interpretation of s 9(2) of the Constitution
Two of the judgments (main and Van der Westhuizen J) accepted that
employment equity by the state must be evaluated through the prism of
s 9(2), although only Van der Westhuizen J provided substantive content to,
and justiﬁcation for, this. Neither of these judgments applied theAct directly.
The two remaining judgments identiﬁed the role that the Act must play in
determining the legality of decisions concerning employment-based afﬁrma-
tive action. Cameron et al JJ gave content to their idea of fairness with
reference to the provisions of ss 2, 6, 15, 20 of the Act, while Jafta J would
limit his to the purpose of the Act set out in s 2. However, neither Cameron
et al JJ, nor Jafta J, developed s 9 of the Constitution as a conceptual frame for
this approach.
In the next part below, I posit an approach that interprets and applies the
Act to decisions concerning afﬁrmative action with due regard to a
conceptual framework derived from s 9 of the Constitution. This recognises
the multiple values underlying the right and develops the precedent set by
Van Heerden to provide a mode of evaluating purpose and effects, with due
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regard to these values, and the constitutional importance of advancing
disadvantaged groups.
The precedent set by Van Heerden
The constitutional standard for positive measures was set in Van Heerden, a
case concerning the application of a positive measure (in the form of
beneﬁcial pension contributions) to ﬁrst-time members of parliament after
1994 (a group that was largely deﬁned by race). At that stage, precedent had
favoured the s 9(3) route, in which positive measures were tested against the
standard of ‘fairness’. This cohered with a broad understanding of those
acting on behalf of ‘victims’ of afﬁrmative action that it was a form of reverse
discrimination requiring a high standard of justiﬁcation. The Constitutional
Court disagreed. Citing the need for ‘a credible and abiding process of
reparation for past exclusion, dispossession, and indignity within the disci-
pline of our constitutional framework’ (para 25) and ‘a positive commitment
progressively to eradicate socially constructed barriers to equality and to root
out systematic or institutionalised under-privilege’, the majority judgment of
Moseneke DCJ identiﬁed ‘a substantive conception of equality inclusive of
measures to redress existing inequality’ (para 31). Within this, ‘[r]emedial
measures are not a derogation from, but a substantive and composite part of,
the equality protection envisaged by the provisions of section 9’ and
‘differentiation aimed at protecting or advancing persons disadvantaged by
unfair discrimination is warranted provided the measures are shown to
conform to the internal test set by section 9(2)’ (para 32). In two minority
judgments, Mokgoro J generally agreed with the approach (with some
reservations: see below) and developed the understanding of the place of
s 9(2) in the right as a whole, and Sachs J agreed with the outcome and
further elaborated the overall approach. I draw on the main and the minority
judgments below, in so far as I ﬁnd them to be clear and logical developments
of each other and of the best overall approach to s 9(2). Overall, I am seeking
the best interpretation of the case and of s 9(2) within a multifaceted and
coherent understanding of the right.
What is important for the purposes of this note is the content of the s 9(2)
test; the manner in which the court seeks to balance competing factors; the
level of scrutiny it applies to this; and the values it uses to justify its
conclusions.
Positive measures certainly attract a lower standard of scrutiny than unfair
discrimination and involve a degree of deference in which the ‘judiciary . . .
[should not] second guess the legislature and the executive concerning the
appropriate measures to overcome the effect of unfair discrimination’ (para
33, Sachs J para 152). However, it is not correct that Van Heerden established a
rationality standard for s 9(2) (as argued by, for example, J L Pretorius
‘Accountability, contextualisation and the standard of judicial review of
afﬁrmative action: Solidarity obo Barnard v South African Police Services’ (2013)
130 SALJ 31). This is an impoverished interpretation of the judgment, which
sets a standard higher than rationality, but perhaps lower than (and different
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from) the fairness threshold of s 9(3). As I argue below, the evaluation can be
read to entail a justiﬁcatory mechanism that balances purpose and effects,
with due regard to multiple values (and especially remedying disadvantage)
within the overall vision of the Constitution.
The court isolated three overlapping criteria in s 9(2) to test positive
measures. First, the measure should target a category of beneﬁciaries
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. There is disagreement in Van Heerden
as to how this should be constituted, with the majority accepting that the
‘overwhelming’ number are of the disadvantaged group, and the minority
judgments wanting the group to be comprised only of disadvantaged persons
(see for example Mokgoro J para 89). Secondly, the measure must be
‘designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of persons’ and
must be ‘reasonably capable of attaining the desired outcome’. No causal
connection is required to show that it actually would achieve such an
outcome (paras 41–2). ‘The fact that the same remedial purpose could have
been achieved in other and possibly better ways would not be enough to
invalidate it’ (Sachs J para 153). Thirdly, the measure must promote ‘the
achievement of equality’ (para 37) and ensure that it does not impose
disproportionate burdens or ‘constitute an abuse of power or impose such
substantial and undue harm on those excluded from its beneﬁts that our
long-term constitutional goal would be threatened’ (para 44, Sachs J para
152).
These criteria demonstrate a concern with the purpose of the measure as
well as its impact, and the underlying values that should guide the appropriate
result. Although the case is more directly relevant to the evaluation of a
positive measure than its implementation, a full reading of Van Heerden can
provide important indicators of the standards and methods of evaluating both
content and implementation.
First, Van Heerden suggests that the evaluation entails a proportional
assessment of purpose and impact, including the various interests affected by
the measure or decision. This is apparent in the manner in which the court
addressed the s 9(2) enquiry, which, across all three factors being evaluated,
involved a fairly detailed scrutiny of the issues, including a consideration of
the measure (or decision) as a whole; its historical context; the duration,
nature and purpose of the measure (paras 45–52); the position of the person
complaining of unfair discrimination and the impact of the measure on him
or her and his or her class (paras 53–6); as well as the position of the group
being promoted (para 48). The nature of this proportional assessment is also
addressed in the concurring judgment of Sachs J (see for example paras 136,
140).
Secondly, this is a contextual enquiry that looks at the issue holistically and
should comprehend the structures of advantage and disadvantage that
underpin the measure or decision (para 44; Sachs J paras 139–42).
Thirdly, it deals with, and draws on, the values underpinning the right
(paras 22; 44, Sachs J paras 140–2). Here the principle of remedying
disadvantage is particularly strong.As Sachs J notes:
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‘The overall effect of section 9(2) . . . is to anchor the equality provision as a
whole around the need to dismantle the structures of disadvantage left behind
by centuries of legalised racial domination, and millennia of legally and socially
structured patriarchal subordination’ (para 141).
Dignity, in the shape of equal concern and respect for all, is also important: it
entails an appreciation of individual dignity along with the dignity of those
affected by apartheid and patriarchy, and thus for all to ‘beneﬁt from the
stability, social harmony and restoration of national dignity that the achieve-
ment of equality brings’ (Sachs J para 145).
Most importantly, in ﬁnding the balance between the competing interests
and principles that might emerge, s 9(2) allows us to place a thumb on the
scale of disadvantage and the remedial purpose of the measure: ‘Given our
historical circumstances and the massive inequalities that plague our society,
the balance when determining whether a measure promotes equality is fair
will be heavily weighted in favour of opening up opportunities for the
disadvantaged’ (Sachs J para 152). Justice Mokgoro describes s 9(2) as
forward-looking with a particular concern with the collective beneﬁt of the
group being advanced, while s 9(3) is backward looking and emphasises the
impact on the group or individual being discriminated against (para 80).
Section 9(2) inevitably gives less weight to the position of the complainant,
but it does consider this and does not merely defer to the need to promote
disadvantaged groups. Overall, the approach to s 9(2) and to ﬁnding the
balance in positive measures is quite different from that of evaluating unfair
discrimination in s 9(3). In s 9(3), individual impact measured by individual
dignity has been determinative; in s 9(2), the goal of remedying group-based
disadvantage is given particular weight.
Using Van Heerden and the Act in evaluating the implementation of employment
equity by the state
In the context of vindicating rights, the Constitutional Court has insisted that
matters be brought under relevant legislation rather than relying on a
constitutional right; for example, in terms of the Promotion of Equality and
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 rather than s 9(3) of the
Constitution, and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
rather than s 33 of the Constitution (MEC Education Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay
2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 40). Thus, if the Act is the starting point for
evaluating positive measures in the workplace, then it must be applied.
Section 6(2) of the Act provides that it is not unfair discrimination to take
afﬁrmative action measures consistent with the purpose of the Act, but
provides no direct guidance on how to evaluate these. Hence many courts
have (incorrectly) adjudicated afﬁrmative action measures in terms of s 6(1)
and unfair discrimination, with its relevant onus. Indeed, the lack of clarity
within the Act on the relationship between s 6(1) and s 6(2)(a), and how to
determine when afﬁrmative action measures are ‘consistent with the pur-
poses of theAct’, has led to confusion and differing approaches in the courts.
The correct approach, it is suggested, is that the Act should be interpreted
and applied with due regard to the Constitution (as is required by s 3 of the
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Act), and in particular s 9(2) and the best interpretation of s 9 set by the court
in Van Heerden. As discussed above, the conceptual framework of s 9(2)
developed from Van Heerden requires all factors to be assessed proportionally
and contextually, but in the balance between remedying disadvantage and
addressing dignity, greater weight should be given to redress of disadvantage.
This section sketches the outlines of this approach in interpreting and
applying the Act to decisions about public sector employment (rather than
the content of employment equity plans).
First, the enquiry is a contextual one that seeks to evaluate both purpose
and effects, taking account of evidence and reasons. The absence of evidence
and reasons can weigh against parties in balancing purpose and effects. The
s 9(2) approach is not a ‘hands-off’ approach although, in the balance, it is
more deferent to purpose over impact, and probably to values of disadvan-
tage over individual dignity. At the risk of repetition, there is no onus that
operates in favour of the complainant. The provision of reasons, values and
justiﬁcation — by the state and in the judgment — not only enables a proper
adjudication of the claim, but also addresses an anxiety about overreach and
abuse of power, accords equal concern and respect to all (City Council of
Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) para 81), and recognises all as
constitutional subjects, even if subjective individual dignity is impaired.
Secondly, the task of balancing purpose and impact, as well as different
values and principles, is assisted by the provisions of the Act. On the side of
the purpose of remedying disadvantage are the purposes of the Act set out in
the preamble and s 2, as well as the more concrete provisions of s 15. Thus
the Act seeks to promote equality and overcome disadvantage, to redress the
past, to provide equal employment opportunities, and to ensure diversity and
equitable representation (preamble, s 2). To do this, it allows afﬁrmative
action measures within the scope of the Act (ss 15 and 20). On the side of
dignity and impact, these measures must be developed and implemented in a
way that furthers the ‘equal dignity and respect of all’ (s 15(2)(b)) and must
not establish ‘an absolute barrier to the continued employment or advance-
ment’ of persons who are not from designated groups (s 15(4)). In addition,
the implementation may include preferential treatment and numerical goals,
but not ﬁxed quotas. Part of the enquiry, therefore, is to establish whether
ﬂexible targets are too rigidly and formulaically applied (s 15(3)). Both the
main and Cameron judgments speak to many of these issues, although the
former does not apply them fully and the latter does so in terms of a fairness
norm.
The Act also speaks to issues of an effective and efﬁcient workforce
(preamble) and the need for afﬁrmative action candidates to be suitably
qualiﬁed (s 20(3) and (4)). Clearly this, too, goes into the mix of evaluating
an afﬁrmative action decision, although it was not directly an issue in the
case. Service delivery, however, was an issue, and this can be linked to the
Act’s concern with efﬁciency and skills (see also the main judgment para 80).
As it is a public sector appointment, the Act can be read and applied in the
context of constitutional obligations to provide an effective and responsive
public service (s 196 of the Constitution).
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Although too brieﬂy sketched, the general approach suggested in this note
is that a full reading of Van Heerden can set a broad conceptual framework for
the detailed application of theAct. How does this differ from what the judges
said in Barnard, especially as both the Cameron and Van der Westhuizen
judgments engage in forms of proportionality and balancing values, purpose
and effects?
The instinct of Cameron et al JJ to work with the Act, to balance
competing factors, and to avoid a presumptive onus of fairness (that
prioritises individual impact) is correct. However, in their reliance on fairness
as the normative standard, the judges limited themselves to a dignity-centred
approach and did not sufﬁciently distinguish between constitutional fairness
under s 9(3), the fair labour practice jurisprudence, and the fairness of
positive measures. Given that the adjudication of fairness in equality
jurisprudence has a particular meaning that is tied to impact and individual
dignity, more work would need to be done to develop fairness as a
mechanism for adjudicating positive measures. Justice Sachs’s minority
judgment in Van Heerden suggests that this is possible (especially paras
136–40), but it requires a much more nuanced and multi-dimensional
approach to s 9 and to equality as a whole. Thus Van der Westhuizen J and
Jafta J were correct to worry about the conceptual coherence of using fairness
under s 9(2) and in relation to afﬁrmative action. Van der Westhuizen J was,
of course, correct to seek to balance the competing principles of dignity and
equality, but the manner of doing so (overloading the right to dignity and
weighing it against an aspect of the right to equality) is cumbersome and
unnecessary. Equality in s 9 is quite capable of incorporating these balancing
mechanisms, and the jurisprudence provides some guidance to that effect. Of
course, to do so, one would have to move away from the dignity-centred
approach, which in itself acts as a barrier. Van der Westhuizen J and the main
judgment were wrong to limit their enquiry to s 9(2) and the Constitution.
Surely, the jurisprudence on subsidiarity tells us that the Act comes ﬁrst and
should be applied. Finally, Jafta J was correct to read s 9(2) and the Act
together, but was wrong to limit the role of the Act to the purpose set out in
s 2. This unduly narrowed the scope of the enquiry on this very important
issue. Thus, no judgment fully captures the importance of deﬁning the
overarching normative and methodological framework set by s 9(2) and its
application to theAct.
CONCLUSION
This note has only sketched the broad brush-strokes of a substantive
interpretation and application of the Act to employment equity decisions
within the overall guidance of the Constitution, especially s 9(2). Funda-
mentally, the argument is for the interpretation of the Act within the
framework of s 9 that the Constitutional Court began to develop in Van
Heerden. It is suggested that the court missed an important opportunity to
develop this approach within a complex understanding of the right to
NOTES 733
JOBNAME: SALJ 15 Part4 PAGE: 24 SESS: 33 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 17 13:15:30 2015
/first/Juta/juta/SALJ−2015−Part4/00notes
substantive equality in s 9. A core argument is that s 9 should not be reduced
to a single value and to different meanings of equal dignity, and that this
cannot, on its own, guide the difﬁcult work that needs to be done in
balancing a jurisprudence of unfair discrimination with one that afﬁrms
positive measures. Rather, the right to substantive equality should be
recognised as one that is informed by several values and principles, and a clear
framework should be established for this. This framework can then inform
the interpretation of theAct and the work that needs to be done in balancing
the different issues and interests raised by the provisions of the Act, within
our overall commitment to a non-sexist and non-racial society based on
freedom, dignity and the achievement of equality.
LOSTWILLSAND SECTION 2(3) OFTHEWILLSACT
MICHAELCAMERONWOOD-BODLEY
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal
INTRODUCTION
It happens from time to time that on the death of a person the deceased’s last
will and testament cannot be found, although it is believed that the deceased
executed a will during his or her lifetime. In such a situation, much will turn
on whether the missing will was known to have been in the deceased’s
possession. If so, then the fact that the will cannot be found gives rise to a
rebuttable presumption that the will was destroyed by the deceased with the
intention to revoke it (Ex parte Warren 1955 (4) SA 326 (W) at 326F–H;
Le Roux v Le Roux 1963 (4) SA273 (C) at 277C–E; Theart v Scheibert [2012] 4
All SA 278 (SCA) para 25 read with para 27; see also M M Corbett, Gys
Hofmeyr & Ellison Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa 2 ed (2001) 99).
Alternatively, if the last will was known to have been in the custody of some
other person, such as the deceased’s attorney or a trusted friend, then no such
presumption of revocation arises (In re Beresford, Ex parte Graham (1883) 2 SC
303 at 305–6; Warren (supra) at 327A–B; Theart (supra) para 27). In such a
case, the lost will is in principle operative, even though it is not physically
available (M J de Waal ‘Law of succession (including administration of
estates) and trusts’ 2012 Annual Survey of South African Law 831 at 842; Linda
Schoeman-Malan ‘Diverse probleme rondom die bestaan en geldigheid van
’n testament by die dood van die testateur (deel 2)’ (2013) 46 De Jure 684 at
692). This applies equally where the presumption of revocation operates, but
is rebutted by the available evidence (see for example Ex parte Serralha 1939
CPD 417 and Ex parte Slade 1922 TPD 220).
In such cases, where the will is lost but still legally operative, it can be given
effect to, provided that there is sufﬁcient evidence to establish its contents,
and the courts enjoy a common-law power to authorise and direct the
Master to accept a copy of the lost will as the deceased’s will. Corbett et al
explain this common-law power as follows (Corbett et al op cit at 117):
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‘In the event of an original will being lost or destroyed, and if there is no
duplicate original, it will, therefore, be necessary for interested parties to apply
to court to obtain an order declaring a copy of the will (where such copy is in
existence) to be the will of the deceased and authorizing the Master to accept
the copy. The application must disclose that the original will was duly executed,
the circumstances under which the will was lost, that the copy is a true copy of
the original and that the original will was not revoked by the testator.’
In such an application, the contents of the lost original might be established
in a number of ways. For example, in Ex parte Serralha (supra) a typed copy of
the original will had been given to the deceased at his request (at 418); in Ex
parte Slade (supra) a carbon copy of the original will was available (at 221); in
Uys NO v Uys [2008] ZANCHC 30 a photocopy of the will was available
(para 3); and in Ex parte Ntuli 1970 (2) SA 278 (W) the contents of the will
were reconstructed relying on the memories of persons who had read the will
after the deceased’s death before it disappeared (see the facts at 278–9).
A court’s powers with respect to the recognition of copies of lost wills are a
function of the working together of rules of the law of succession and the
more generally applicable rules of the law of evidence. As explained earlier,
the lost will does not lose its legal efﬁcacy unless it is presumed or shown to
have been revoked. The principles of evidence, however, require the
contents of any document, including a will, to be proven by production of
the original thereof. This is the so-called best evidence rule. In the case of a
lost document, however, there is an exception to this rule, which applies
when satisfactory reasons can be given for the failure to produce the original.
Importantly, this exception forms the basis of the courts’ power to order the
Master to accept a mere copy of a will, as explained in the seminal decision of
In re Beresford, Ex parte Graham (supra) at 306:
‘Now it is a wholesome principle . . . that a party on whom it is ‘‘incumbent to
prove any fact, matter or thing is bound to give the best evidence of which from
its nature such fact, matter or thing is capable’’. Upon this principle it is a
general rule that the contents of a document must be proved by primary
evidence, that is to say, by the production of the document itself. It is clear,
however, that such a rule if rigidly adhered to must often be productive of
extreme injustice, and accordingly certain exceptions have from time to time
been grafted upon it, under which secondary evidence may in certain cases be
given of the contents of a document. One of these exceptions is where the
original has been lost and proper search has been made for it, for in such a case a
copy made from the original and proved to be correct is admissible as evidence,
and even oral testimony of the contents of the document may be given by
persons who have themselves seen it. In the present case it is not necessary to
resort to such oral evidence, because we are satisﬁed that the copy which has
been produced is a correct copy of the original will.’
(In this connection see also the comments in Kuhnemund v The Master of the
High Court 1922 SWA 78 at 80, where the court indicates that use of ‘parole
evidence’ is permitted to establish the contents of a lost will.) This
explanation of the jurisprudential origins of the courts’ powers to accept a
NOTES 735
JOBNAME: SALJ 15 Part4 PAGE: 26 SESS: 33 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 17 13:15:30 2015
/first/Juta/juta/SALJ−2015−Part4/00notes
copy of a lost will will be relevant to the analysis that follows the case
discussion below.
An interesting question that has arisen more recently, and which is the
focus of this note, is the interrelationship between the courts’ common-law
powers with respect to a lost will and their statutory powers in terms of s 2(3)
of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 (as amended) (hereinafter ‘the Wills Act’). Section
2(3) was introduced into the Wills Act in 1992 and its purpose is to avoid a
situation in which the genuine will of a testator is frustrated for want of
compliance with the relevant will-making formalities (Stoltz ID v The Master
1994 (2) PH G2 (E)). Section 2(3) reads as follows:
‘If a court is satisﬁed that a document or the amendment of a document drafted
or executed by a person who has died since the drafting or execution thereof,
was intended to be his will or an amendment of his will, the court shall order
the Master to accept that document, or that document as amended, for the
purposes of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 66 of 1965), as a will,
although it does not comply with all the formalities for the execution or
amendment of wills referred to in subsection (1).’
Signiﬁcantly, if a deceased’s will has been lost in circumstances which do
not indicate revocation of the will, the question arises whether it is
competent for a court in terms of s 2(3) to order the Master to accept a copy
or transcript of the will as the deceased’s will. This question arises in two
distinct situations. The ﬁrst is where the lost original was duly executed in
terms of the will-making formalities (for the formalities see s 2(1) of the Wills
Act); and the second is where the lost original was not executed in
compliance with the will-making formalities, but the deceased intended it to
be his or her will.
The case law on the use of s 2(3) with respect to a lost will is limited and in
some respects unsatisfactory (Ex parte Porter 2010 (5) SA 546 (WCC);
Haribans NO v Haribans [2011] ZAKZPHC 46; Hassan v Mentor NO [2012]
ZAGPPHC 74 (referred to in some writings as H v M NO [2012] JOL 29002
(GNP)); Yokwana v Yokwana [2013] ZAWCHC 22 and Smith v Sampson
[2013] ZAWCHC 11). In what follows, these cases will be explained and
critically examined. Thereafter, a modiﬁed approach will be suggested,
which takes into account the important distinction between lost wills that
were duly executed and those that were not.
CASE LAW
Porter
Ex parte Porter (supra), a decision of the Western Cape High Court, Cape
Town, concerned a missing codicil to the testator’s will (para 2). Although
not a will itself, a codicil is on the same footing and the same principles are
applicable. The testator’s attorney prepared and e-mailed a draft codicil to the
testator’s home, which the testator then printed out and signed, in compli-
ance with the relevant will-making formalities (para 3). Thereafter, the
signed codicil was placed in an envelope and delivered by a messenger to the
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attorney’s ofﬁces (para 2). The attorney’s receptionist recalled receiving the
envelope, although she was unaware of its contents. Thereafter, no one could
say what became of the envelope and its contents (ibid). After the testator’s
death, an application was brought for an order, in terms of s 2(3) of the Wills
Act, directing the Master to accept a copy of the codicil, in the form of a print
out from the e-mail mentioned above, as a codicil to the testator’s will (para
5). This relief was, however, refused by Binns-Ward J because (para 8):
‘The document which the testator executed complied in all respects with the
prescribed formalities. That was the document which the testator intended to
be a codicil to his will. The document which the applicants seek to have the
Master directed to accept is not that document, but only a template of the one
that was executed. In my view these characteristics, which are distinguishable
from those that would be apparent in the kind of document contemplated in
s 2(3) of theWillsAct, make it clear that the provision is not intended to address
the predicament that arises when the testamentary instrument in issue has been
executed in compliance with the formalities but has subsequently been lost.’
Binns-Ward J went on to say that in his view the term ‘document’ in s 2(3)
did not include ‘any document which exactly replicated the text of the
intended testamentary instrument’, but is conﬁned to ‘the narrower concept
of the actual piece of paper in issue’ (para 11). For these reasons, he held that
the requirements of s 2(3) were not satisﬁed and that application ought to
have been made in terms of the common law for the court to authorise that a
‘reconstructed copy’ of the codicil be accepted by the Master (para 12). All
was not lost however, because Binns-Ward J went on to ﬁnd that the
requirements of the common law in that regard were satisﬁed on the evidence
available and, relying on the applicant’s standard prayer for alternative relief, he
granted such an order in the form of a rule nisi (paras 12 and 13).
Haribans
Haribans NO v Haribans (supra), a decision of the KwaZulu-Natal High
Court, Pietermaritzburg, concerned a dispute between two brothers regard-
ing which of two wills was the genuine last will of their late father who had
died in November 2005 (para 1 read with para 6; for convenience the parties
will hereafter be referred to as the ‘appellant’ and the ‘respondent’). After the
deceased’s death, the administration of his estate commenced in terms of a
will that had been validly executed in 2004 (‘the 2004 will’) (para 6(d)) and
which disinherited the respondent (para 19). However, just as the estate was
on the verge of being completely wound up, a photocopy of a further will,
purportedly executed in 2005 (‘the 2005 will’), made a mysterious appear-
ance. The 2005 will included the respondent as a beneﬁciary (paras 15(l) and
31(g)(i)).
The respondent explained the discovery of the copy of the 2005 will as
follows: the respondent’s attorney had requested that a copy of the deceased’s
late wife’s will be obtained from the Master’s Ofﬁce in connection with
another matter which the attorney was handling for the respondent (para 6(e)
read with para 15(l)). When an ofﬁcial of the Master’s Ofﬁce gave the
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respondent’s wife a copy of the deceased’s wife’s will, a copy of the 2005 will,
purportedly executed by the deceased, was found to be attached to it (para
15(l)). No explanation could be given as to how the copy of the deceased’s
2005 will had ended up in the ﬁle relating to his predeceased wife’s estate
(para 11(i)), and the original could not be found (para 11(l)). Evidence was
led regarding the circumstances in which ﬁles are stored and retrieved by the
Master’s Ofﬁce (para 13), as to the veracity of the testator’s signature on the
2005 will (para 14), and as to bad blood that existed between the deceased
and the respondent (paras 15(f)–(g) and 20(d)–(g)). The court a quo had
granted an order directing the Master to accept the 2005 will as the testator’s
will (para 4) and the matter went on appeal to a full bench of the
KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg (para 5). In the event, after
considering all the evidence as a whole, the full bench was of the view that it
could not be said on a balance of probabilities that the 2005 will was in fact
the will of the deceased (para 41, judgment paraphrased). Accordingly, the
appeal succeeded and the order directing the Master to accept the 2005 will
was set aside (para 44).
What is noteworthy about the judgment in the present context is that no
adverse comment was made by the full bench regarding the use of s 2(3) of
the Wills Act in respect of a document that, if genuine, was a copy of a duly
executed will. Indeed, early in the judgment, the court states (para 9,
emphasis supplied):
‘Although there is no suggestion that the copy of the disputed will (the
document relied upon) does not comply with all the formalities of the Wills
Act, 1953, the respondent nonetheless bore the onus to establish on a balance of
probabilities that the document was a copy of a valid will executed by the
deceased. . . . Once the court is satisfied in that regard it has no discretion but to order the
Master to accept the document as a will for the purposes of the Administration of Estates
Act, 1965.’
Accordingly, the full bench appears to have accepted that had the 2005 will
been shown to have been genuine, then proceedings in terms of s 2(3) would
have been appropriate. However, there is no indication in the judgment that
the propriety of using s 2(3) was ever placed in issue by the appellants.
Moreover, the full bench’s conclusion on the facts made it unnecessary for it
actually to make a ruling on this issue. Consequently, its apparent acceptance
in principle of the application of s 2(3) to a copy of a duly executed will is
obiter.
Hassan
In Hassan v Mentor NO (supra), a decision of the Gauteng North High Court,
Pretoria, the dispute was between the deceased’s two children by his ﬁrst
marriage (hereinafter the ‘applicants’) and his son by a second marriage
(represented by his son’s mother because his son was then a minor,
hereinafter the ‘respondent’) (para 2.9). After the deceased’s death, no
original will could be found (para 4.1). However, one of the applicants found
a document amongst the deceased’s personal documents that purported to be
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a copy of a duly executed typewritten will of the deceased (paras 4.2 and 4.3
read with para 6). This document bequeathed the deceased’s estate to the two
applicants and left nothing to the respondent (para 4.4). The evidence was
that shortly before his death, the deceased had told one of the applicants (and
her husband) that he had left a will with his attorneys that appointed the
applicants as sole heirs (para 7.3). After the deceased’s death, the attorneys
conﬁrmed having prepared the will in question but, notwithstanding a
diligent search, the original could not be found in their ofﬁces (para 7.6). It
appeared that the original document had been duly executed as a will (para
6), so that the court was dealing with a lost will and not a defective will.
Nevertheless, the judgment records (without adverse comment) that the
applicants relied on s 2(3) (para 5), and the court described its order as one
‘corresponding with the terms as claimed by the Applicants in their notice of
motion’ (para 14). Whilst the order does not expressly state that it was issued
in terms of s 2(3), it would appear that the court was acting in terms of that
provision. If it were otherwise, one would have expected comment from the
court that it was granting the order on a ground other than that on which the
applicants had relied. Furthermore, there was no debate whether an order on
the ground relied upon by the applicants was appropriate and there was no
reference to the views of Binns-Ward J in Porter (supra). The question
whether the use of s 2(3) would be proper does not appear to have been
placed in issue by the respondents. Accordingly, although the matter is not
entirely clear, I cannot agree with the view of Schoeman-Malan who states
(Schoeman-Malan op cit at 700, emphasis supplied):
‘In Hassan v Mentor lyk dit of regter Davis die standpunt van regter Binns-Ward volg
waar ’n aansoek om kondonering van ’n afskrif gedoen is. Die testament was
behoorlik verly maar het velore geraak. Die hof verklaar dat die afskrif as
testament aanvaar kan word. Daar is egter nie ’n uitdruklike aanduiding of die
kondonasie roete of die gemeneregtelike roete toepas is nie.’
There is, with respect, no indication that the judge was aware of the views of
Binns-Ward J or that he was following them.
Yokwana
Yokwana v Yokwana (supra), a decision of the Western Cape High Court,
Cape Town, involved a dispute between the deceased’s son (hereinafter the
‘applicant’ (para 1)) and daughter (hereinafter the ‘respondent’ (para 3)). The
applicant sought an order in terms of s 2(3) of the Wills Act, alternatively
under the common law, directing the Master to accept a certain document as
the will of the deceased (para 1). The document concerned was a copy of a
will that had apparently been executed by the deceased at her attorney’s
ofﬁces (para 3 read with para 10). Unfortunately, the original document did
not comply with the will-making formalities (paras 3 and 10 read with para
12). It seems that the original will was left in the custody of her attorneys
(para 8), which means that the rebuttable presumption of revocation by
destruction would not have come into play. There is no explanation apparent
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from the judgment as to how the original will came to be lost, nor is it
entirely clear how the applicant came to be in possession of a copy of it (see
the discussion in para 8). We must assume that the attorneys, who had
possession of the original, supplied it. Binns-Ward J was satisﬁed on the
evidence available, which included the evidence of a handwriting expert
relating to the deceased’s signature on the document, that the document was
authentic and that the deceased had intended the original signed by her to set
out her testamentary wishes (para 25 read with para 26).
Had the document before the court been the original will, there would
have been no difﬁculty in applying s 2(3) of the Wills Act. The applicant
conceded, however, consistently with Binns-Ward J’s ruling in Porter (supra),
that the relief sought under s 2(3) of the Wills Act was not available because
the document before the court was not the actual document signed by the
deceased (para 1). Accordingly, the matter fell to be dealt with in terms of the
court’s common-law powers. One would have thought that this would have
left the applicant in grave difﬁculty because the courts have never before
claimed authority to accept as a will a document that does not comply with
the will-making formalities of s 2(1) of theWillsAct, except within the ambit
of the statutory exception provided by s 2(3). Nevertheless, Binns-Ward J
granted an order that the Master accept the copy as the deceased’s will (para
29). In doing so, he purported to be acting in terms of the common law (para
28). After referring to judgments in which the court had relied on draft wills
to reconstruct the deceased’s original will (para 1, namely Ex parte Gowree
1915 CPD 108, Ex parte Ntuli (supra) and Nell v Talbot NO 1971 (1) SA 207
(D)), Binns-Ward J went on to state (para 2, emphasis supplied):
‘The last-mentioned three judgments concerned draft wills, or in Talbot’s case, a
prior will which had been superseded by a lost will which contained an
additional provision which, because its operation was predicated on the
simultaneous demise of the co-testators, did not have any effect in the particular
factual circumstances. The governing principle applied in all these cases,
however, is that the court may direct the Master to accept as a will any
document containing testamentary dispositions if it is satisﬁed that the contents
accurately and completely reﬂect the intending testator’s testamentary inten-
tions. That a document that is proven to be a true copy of one actually executed
as a will should fall within the embrace of the common law power is thus
axiomatic in my judgment. It matters not that the original might not have complied
with the formalities prescribed in terms of the Wills Act.’
The validity of this assertion will be assessed in the analysis below.
Smith
Smith v Sampson (supra), a decision of the Western Cape High Court, Cape
Town, involved a request for the court to accept a reconstructed document
as the deceased’s will. The facts are not entirely clear from the judgment. It is
not expressly stated that the application was for an order in terms of s 2(3),
but the judge’s description of the order prayed echoes the wording of s 2(3)
(para 1). The deceased died in 2009 (para 5) leaving a valid will executed in
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1992, in which he bequeathed his entire estate to his daughter (paras 3 and 8).
However, the deceased’s wife (hereinafter the ‘applicant’) contended that in
2002, she and the deceased decided to execute a joint will appointing the
survivor of them as sole beneﬁciary of the ﬁrst dying (para 4). She alleged that
a draft will, giving effect to this intention, was prepared by a third party by
the name of Chotia (para 4). There is no mention of the draft being signed,
nor any explanation of the failure to do so (assuming that it was not signed),
but the judgment is not entirely clear on this fact (cf para 4 which refers to
‘draft will’ and para 5 which refers to ‘the Will’). Presumably, if the draft had
been executed, this would have merited express mention in the judgment.
After the deceased’s death, ‘the Will’ could not be found and the applicant
sought an order directing the Master to accept a reconstructed copy of it (para
5). In the event, the court concluded that on the facts there was insufﬁcient
evidence to reconstruct the will accurately and completely (paras 13 and 14).
Despite the fact that the court appeared to be dealing with a reconstruction of
an unexecuted will, there is no mention of the requirements of s 2(3).
Regarding the legal position TraversoAJP states simply (para 12):
‘It is well established that where the original Will has been lost or destroyed it
will [be] necessary to apply to Court for an order declaring a copy of the Will to
be the Will of the deceased and an order authorising the acceptance by the
Master of the copy. However where no copy of a lostWill is available, evidence
is admissible to prove the contents of the Will, and where such evidence
satisfactorily establishes the contents of the Will, a Court will order that the
reconstructed Will be accepted as the Last Will of the testator. However, in
order to grant such relief the Court must be satisﬁed that the reconstruction is
both accurate and complete. The onus to prove this on a balance of probabilities
is on the party seeking the relief.’
Although the situation is far from clear, it would appear that the court would
have been willing to make a s 2(3) order in respect of a lost, defectively
executed will, had the evidence before the court been sufﬁcient to justify
relief. In the event, however, sufﬁcient evidence was not forthcoming.
ANALYSIS
General comments
If we are going to recognise defectively executed wills, as s 2(3) now requires
us to do, there would seem to be no reason in principle why the defectively
executed will should be treated any differently to the duly executed will, if
the original defective document cannot be found after the deceased’s death or
is found at death, but is subsequently lost or destroyed before the estate can be
wound up. In other words, there ought to be provision for the courts to
recognise it. However, the courts are constrained by the fact that their
powers to condone the failure to execute a will properly are regulated by
statute and, consequently, if the provisions of s 2(3), properly construed, do
not allow for recognition of a defectively executed will that has been lost or
accidentally destroyed, then we must recognise that there is a lacuna in the
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legislation. Fortunately, as will appear from the discussion that follows, I do
not believe that such lacuna exists.
It is clear from the case discussion in the previous section that the law
relating to the application of s 2(3) to wills that have been lost or accidentally
destroyed cannot be regarded as settled. With respect to duly executed wills
that have been lost or accidentally destroyed: Porter ruled that s 2(3) was not
applicable, but granted an order at common law; Hassan granted an order
where the applicants relied on s 2(3), but without any analysis as to whether
the statutory remedy was properly available and without expressly referring
to s 2(3) in the order; and Haribans stated, without any analysis, that s 2(3) is
available. However, in view of its ﬁndings on the facts, it was not necessary
for the court in Haribans to come to a decision on the law. Its views on this
issue, therefore, are obiter. Furthermore, the fact that the Haribans judgment
did not discuss the possible objections to the use of s 2(3) with respect to a
duly executed lost will also diminishes the value of the court’s views on this
issue — the contrary views of Binns-Ward J in Porter would certainly have
merited discussion if the full bench had been made aware of them. However,
there is no indication that the court was alerted to his judgment.As will appear
from my discussion of Porter in due course, I agree with Binns-Ward J’s view
that s 2(3) is not intended to be used with respect to duly executed wills.
With respect to defectively executed wills that have been lost or acciden-
tally destroyed, counsel in Yokwana conceded that s 2(3) is not available when
the original document cannot be produced, consistently with the views that
the presiding judge had previously expressed in Porter. However, the court
took the novel approach of making an order in terms of its common law
powers in respect of a copy of a defectively executed will. In Haribans, it
seems that the court was of the contrary view that a s 2(3) order can be issued
in respect of a defectively executed will that has been lost, in light of its brief
statement of the law, which did not distinguish between lost wills that are
duly executed and those that are not. However, the case actually was only
concerned with a duly executed document. As will appear from my
discussion of Yokwana (below), I believe that the decision in that case is
incorrect, and that s 2(3) can be used properly with respect to a defectively
executed will that has been lost or accidentally destroyed.
In what follows I will indicate my views on the merits of each of the
judgments under discussion in turn.
Hassan
As indicated above, I understand the judgment in Hassan as one in which the
court actually granted an order in terms of s 2(3) in respect of a duly executed
document. (Admittedly, there is an element of uncertainty around the basis
on which the order was made.) The judgment makes no mention of the
contrary approach in Porter, and it seems likely the court was unaware of the
Porter judgment. For the reasons indicated in my discussion of Porter below, I
am of the view that the Hassan decision is incorrect in so far as the order was
made in terms of s 2(3). The order ought to have been made in terms of the
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court’s common law powers relating to lost wills (see De Waal op cit at 843,
who alludes to the element of ambiguity around the basis of the order and
also states that if it was made in terms of s 2(3) then it was ‘clearly wrong’).
Porter
In Porter, the court was concerned with a duly executed missing codicil.
Binns-Ward J’s reasons for refusing an order in terms of s 2(3) were two-fold.
First, he seems to have been of the view that the section is only intended to
deal with documents that do not comply with the execution formalities. He
points out that the codicil in question complied with the formalities and,
therefore, its characteristics are distinguishable from those that would be
apparent in the kind of document contemplated by s 2(3) (para 8, para-
phrased). Secondly, he relied on the meaning of the word ‘document’ in
s 2(3) and argued that the document that the section refers to, and in respect
of which a court makes an order, is the actual piece of paper which the
deceased intended to be his will, and that its place cannot be taken by a
replica of the document where the original has been lost (para 11). As a result
of this approach, Binns-Ward J completely excluded the use of s 2(3) in
respect of all lost documents, even, as appears from Yokwana, those that were
defectively executed.
In my view, Binns-Ward J is correct in his view that s 2(3) is not intended
to apply to a duly executed will that has been lost or accidentally destroyed.
The history of the enactment of s 2(3), as appears from the pre-enactment
deliberations of the SouthAfrican Law Commission, shows clearly that it was
intended to confer a power on the courts to condone a failure to comply with
the execution formalities (South African Law Commission Report on Project
22: Review of the Law of Succession (June 1991) 4–14). In the words of Navsa JA
in Van der Merwe v Master of the High Court 2010 (6) SA 544 (SCA) paras 14
and 16:
‘By enacting s 2(3) of the Act the legislature was intent on ensuring that failure
to comply with the formalities prescribed by the Act should not frustrate or
defeat the genuine intention of testators. . . . The very object of s 2(3), as
pointed out above, is to ameliorate the situation where formalities have not
been complied with but where the true intention of the drafter of a document is
self-evident.’
That the purpose of s 2(3) is to condone failure to comply with the
formalities is also indicated in the closing words of the section, which
indicate that the court has the power to order the acceptance of the
defectively executed will ‘although it does not comply with all the formalities
for the execution or amendment of wills referred to in subsection (1)’.
Schoeman-Malan also supports the decision in Porter on this point. She
states (op cit at 699):
‘Artikel 2(3) handel spesiﬁek met kondonering van nie-nakoming van for-
maliteite in artikel 2(1) en bied nie gepaste regshulp waar ’n ‘‘geldige verlyde
testament’’ vermis word of verlore geraak het nie. Artikel 2(3) val dus streng
NOTES 743
JOBNAME: SALJ 15 Part4 PAGE: 34 SESS: 36 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 17 13:15:30 2015
/first/Juta/juta/SALJ−2015−Part4/00notes
gesproke buite die konteks van hierdie bespreking. Daar blyk egter onduidelik-
heid te wees ten aansien van die aanwending van artikel 2(3). ’n Artikel
2(3)-aansoek maak nie voorsiening vir kondonering van ’n afskrif van ’n
geldige testament nie, maar vir ’n dokument wat nie aan die formaliteitsvere-
istes voldoen nie. . . . In Ex parte Porter (waar die testament na die dood van die
testateur vermis word) word tereg bevind dat ’n artikel 2(3)-aansoek nie die
korrekte prosedure is om ’n verlore testament te bewys nie.’
(See also M J de Waal ‘The law of succession (including administration of
estates) and trusts’ 2010 Annual Survey of South African Law 1170 at 1183,
where he states that ‘Porter was certainly the correct case in which to apply
the common-law relief opted for by the court’.)
In my view, Binns-Ward J’s second objection to the use of s 2(3) in relation
to a lost will (which would apply to all lost wills, however they were
executed) is not well founded. If application is made in terms of s 2(3) with
respect to an informal will (that is, a will that does not comply with the
formalities) that has been lost, then the document the court is concerned
with is the very document that the deceased allegedly intended to be his or
her will. It is that document, which is not actually before the court, that must
satisfy the requirements of s 2(3) that it must have been drafted or executed
by a person who has since died and who intended it to be his or her will.
However, because the document itself is not available to the court, its
contents will be proven by means of a copy or a reconstructed document, in
terms of the law of evidence, provided that sufﬁcient reason has been given
for not being able to produce the original informal will. This does no
violence to the wording of s 2(3) — it does not involve an attenuated
interpretation of the term ‘document’ or of any of the other requirements of
the section. It is a simple application of the section read with the established
principles of the law of evidence, and the legislature is presumed to have been
cognisant of these principles when the section was enacted. Importantly, it is
not s 2(3) itself that permits the use of a copy in these circumstances — the
section is not directed at the problem of lost wills — it is the general
framework of the law of evidence which does so. This means, however, that
if the lost will is not an informal will, but one that was properly executed,
then s 2(3) has no legitimate role in the proceedings, for the reasons given in
Binns-Ward J’s ﬁrst objection and as reﬂected in my earlier discussion of
Haribans.
Owing to Binns-Ward J’s incorrect focus on whether the e-mail itself
complied with the requirements of s 2(3), it became necessary to consider
whether such requirements, that the document be drafted or executed by the
deceased, had been satisﬁed by the e-mail itself. In this respect, Binns-Ward J
applied the decision in Bekker v Naude 2003 (5) SA 173 (SCA). He thus held
that an e-mail that a testator caused to be drafted by another person cannot be
regarded as having been drafted by the testator himself as required by s 2(3)
(see Porter paras 10–11. Binns-Ward J’s conclusion that the deceased could
not be held to have drafted the e-mail was correct: De Waal 2010 Annual
Survey of South African Law op cit at 1183). However, since the lost codicil had
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been duly executed, s 2(3) actually was irrelevant. The question that should
have been asked was whether the e-mail accurately established the contents of
the lost will, as required by the common law principles relating to lost wills.
Schoeman-Malan’s approval of Porter is in general terms and does not
speciﬁcally discuss the use of s 2(3) in respect of a defectively executed lost
will (Schoeman-Malan op cit at 699, as quoted above).Although Schoeman-
Malan does mention Yokwana (which dealt with a defectively executed lost
document), this is done in passing, without expressing an opinion on
whether it was correctly decided.
Yokwana
In my view, the decision of Binns-Ward J in Yokwana, in which the court
used its common-law powers to give effect to a copy of a defectively
executed document, is wrong. Binns-Ward J cites Corbett et al (op cit at
116–17) as authority for his statement (para 1) that:
‘The court does, however, have jurisdiction under the common law to direct
the Master to accept a reconstruction of a will that has become lost provided it is
satisﬁed that the reconstruction is both accurate and complete.’
What he omits to mention, however, is that Corbett expressly states that the
original will must have been duly executed (Corbett et al op cit at 117).
Binns-Ward J then goes on to refer to Ex parte Gowree (supra) and Ex parte
Ntuli (supra) and states that these judgments ‘concerned draft wills’ (para 2). It
is not clear whether this assertion is intended to justify the ultimate assertion
that ‘[i]t matters not that the original [will] might not have complied with the
formalities prescribed in terms of the Wills Act’ (para 2). However, if that is
so, then the reliance is misplaced, because the cases referred to do not provide
such authority. In Gowree (supra) there is no speciﬁc mention of how the
original will was executed. Furthermore, use of a reconstructed copy (as
occurred in Gowree (supra)) does not provide common law authority for
recognition of a will that was defectively executed. In Ntuli (supra), the facts
(which are provided in the headnote at 278E) suggest that the original will
was duly executed, so it also does not provide support for a common-law
power of a court to recognise a copy of a defectively executed will.
As already indicated, Corbett expressly states in respect of the court’s
common-law powers that the application for recognition ‘must disclose that
the original will was duly executed’ (Corbett et al op cit at 117). Unfortu-
nately, most of the judgments dealing with the courts’ common-law powers
are terse and do not comprehensively state the requirements for an order. A
notable exception, however, is Uys NO v Uys (supra) in which the
requirements listed by Corbett, including that the original will was validly
executed, are speciﬁcally indicated (para 9). Of the cases cited by Corbett
(Corbett et al op cit 117n29), only Kuhnemund v The Master of the High Court
(supra) expressly sets out the requirement that the original will must have
been duly executed (at 79). In fact, the outcome of the case turned, in part,
on whether the will had been executed properly (Kuhnemund (supra) at 80).
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In several of the other judgments, the facts indicate that the original was duly
executed, but it is not something that is discussed speciﬁcally as a requirement
for an order (see In re Beresford, Ex parte Graham (supra) at 305; In re Guruvadoo
(1900) 21 NLR 187 at 187 ﬁrst para; Ex parte Serralha (supra) at 418 ﬁrst para;
Ex parte Hartley 1937 SR 237 at 237 second last para; and Ex parte Ntuli
(supra) at 278E). In the remaining cases, no mention is made of how the
original will was executed (see In re Templeman’s Estate (1900) 17 SC 226; Re
Duminy 1902 TS 190; In the joint will of J M Kemp and C J Kemp (1906) 27
NLR 309; Ex parte Adcock 1909 TH 271; Ex parte Gowree (supra); Ex parte
Webb’s Estate 1922 EDL 150; Ex parte Slade (supra); Ex parte Bremont 1930
WLD 127; and Ex parte Roux 1937 OPD 32).
There does not seem to be any case (other than Yokwana itself) in which a
court granted an order under the common law directing the Master to accept
a defectively executed will. This is not surprising. To grant such an order
would ﬂy in the face of s 2(1)(a) of the Wills Act, which states that no will,
executed on or after the ﬁrst day of January 1954 shall be valid, unless the
formal requirements for validity are satisﬁed. The only power of a court to
condone the defective execution of a will is that provided for by s 2(3), the
use of which Binns-Ward J eschewed in connection with lost wills. The
courts have no other power to accept wills that do not comply with the
formalities. That is surely why Corbett et al maintain that a common-law
application in respect of a lost will must disclose that the original was duly
executed (Corbett et al at 117). Accordingly, since Binns-Ward J rejected the
use of s 2(3) in all cases where the document before the court is not the
original, he was not free to make an order directing the Master to accept the
copy of the defectively executed will. Nevertheless, as indicated above, it is
my view that if we view the rules relating to the recognition of a copy in their
proper context (as grounded in the law of evidence), then it becomes
permissible to make an order in terms of s 2(3) with respect to a defectively
executed lost will. For this reason, the order in Yokwana should have been
made in terms of s 2(3).
To summarise, Binns-Ward J was correct to hold that a court does not
have the power to grant an order in terms of s 2(3) in respect of a lost will that
was properly executed. The proper order would be an order in terms of the
court’s common-law powers. It cannot be correct, however, that there is a
blanket exclusion of all lost wills from the purview of s 2(3), even those that
do not comply with the will-making formalities. Where a lost will was
defectively executed, the court must proceed in terms of s 2(3), read with the
rules of the law of evidence, which permit it to accept proof of the contents
of the document by way of a copy, provided there is an adequate explanation
for the failure to produce the original.
Smith
It is difﬁcult to know what to make of the judgment in Smith’s case. Clearly
there was insufﬁcient evidence to support an order accepting the recon-
structed will and in that respect the judgment is correct. Although the court
(2015) 132 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL746
JOBNAME: SALJ 15 Part4 PAGE: 37 SESS: 33 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 17 13:15:30 2015
/first/Juta/juta/SALJ−2015−Part4/00notes
appeared to be dealing with the reconstruction of an unexecuted will, there is
no discussion of the interrelationship between the court’s common law
powers and s 2(3). Furthermore, the court does not appear to have been
alerted to the judgment of Binns-Ward J in Porter, a case in the same division,
to the effect that s 2(3) is inapplicable in the case of lost wills. In so far as Smith
would appear to support the use of s 2(3) with respect to a defectively
executed lost will, I agree with the decision.
CONCLUSION
The case law on the use of s 2(3) of theWillsAct with respect to lost wills is in
an unsatisfactory state. On the one hand, the decisions in Haribans and (it
seems) Hassan would permit the use of s 2(3) in respect of a duly executed
will that has been lost. This is arguably contrary to the purpose for which the
section was enacted, as reﬂected in the ﬁnal words of the section that require
the court to order the Master to accept a will ‘although it does not comply
with all the formalities for the execution . . . of wills’. On the other hand,
Porter and Yokwana take the view that s 2(3) cannot be used in connection
with any lost will, making no exception for one that does not comply with
the will-making formalities. In Yokwana, the court’s use of its common-law
powers relating to lost documents to order the Master to accept a copy of a
defectively executed will was clearly wrong, since the court’s only power to
condone defective execution is the power given in s 2(3). Otherwise,
according to s 2(1)(a), no will shall be valid unless it complies with the
prescribed formalities. Therefore, if Porter was correctly decided, it would
mean that a defectively executed document that was lost, even one lost after
the death of the testator, cannot be given effect to at all. This would amount
to a serious lacuna in the courts’ powers. However, Porter is wrong on this
point.
I have argued that whilst it is not correct to make an order in terms of s 2(3)
with respect to a duly executed will that has been lost, the general principles
of the law of evidence permit a court to issue an order in terms of s 2(3) with
respect to a defectively executed, lost will. The application of s 2(3) to such a
will would have to satisfy the section’s speciﬁc requirements, namely that the
lost document be one personally drafted or executed by the deceased who
intended for it to be his or her will. In addition, the applicant would have to
show the circumstances in which the defective will was lost, that it cannot be
found despite a diligent search, that it was not revoked by the deceased (and
here, the usual presumptions would operate), and that the copy presented to
the court is a true copy of the original, or an accurate and complete
reconstruction thereof (Uys v Uys (supra) para 9).
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CONTAINING THE MALADY OF CORRUPTION IN SOUTH
AFRICA: CANTHE COURTS STEMTHETIDE?
FRANCOIS VENTER
Professor, North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus)
It is painful, twenty years after the introduction of South Africa to
constitutionalism, to read the opening paragraph of the judgment of the
Constitutional Court delivered by Chief Justice Mogoeng in Helen Suzman
Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa & others; Glenister v President
of the Republic of South Africa & others 2015 (2) SA1 (CC):
‘All South Africans across the racial, religious, class and political divide are in
broad agreement that corruption is rife in this country and that stringent
measures are required to contain this malady before it graduates into something
terminal.’
It is even more painful to observe that this and various related cases deal with
an obvious reluctance on the part of a government that has been in ofﬁce
during the entire period of constitutional supremacy to establish effective
measures to contain the corruption before it becomes ‘something terminal’.
There is however some relief for the pain to be found in the fact that the
judiciary is willing to engage the legislative and executive branches in calling
them to constitutional order regarding their responsibilities concerning the
curbing of corruption.
The Directorate of Special Operations was launched in 2000 under the
popular designation ‘the Scorpions’ as a component of the National Prose-
cuting Authority (‘NPA’). The NPA’s existence and general nature is
provided for in s 179 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996. Section 179(4) of the Constitution provides that ‘national legislation
must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without
fear, favour or prejudice’. Furthermore, s 32(1)(b) of the National Prosecut-
ingAuthorityAct 32 of 1998 (‘the NPAAct’) provides:
‘Subject to the Constitution and this Act, no organ of state and no member or
employee of an organ of state nor any other person shall improperly interfere
with, hinder or obstruct the prosecuting authority or any member thereof in
the exercise, carrying out or performance of its, his or her powers, duties and
functions.’
When the disbandment of the Scorpions (ostensibly for reasons concerning
the investigation of criminal activity among highly placed political ﬁgures)
was announced in 2008, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (‘OECD’) Working Group on Bribery in International Busi-
ness Transactions expressed its serious concern in its Phase 1 Review on
South Africa (para 96, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/30/
40883135.pdf, accessed on 13 January 2015).
Through the amendment of both the NPA Act and the South African
Police Service Act 68 of 1995 (‘the SAPS Act’), the Scorpions Unit was
replaced in 2008 by ‘the Hawks’, statutorily designated the ‘Directorate for
Priority Crime Investigation’ (‘DPCI’). The Hawks are detached from the
(2015) 132 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL748
JOBNAME: SALJ 15 Part4 PAGE: 39 SESS: 33 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 17 13:15:30 2015
/first/Juta/juta/SALJ−2015−Part4/00notes
NPA and their directorate is positioned within the South African Police
Service. In terms of s 206(1) of the Constitution ‘[a] member of the Cabinet
must be responsible for policing and must determine national policing
policy’.
Noting these developments, and the ensuing litigation up to and before
the judgment of the Constitutional Court in November 2014, the OECD’s
Working Group expressed, in its Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention in South Africa (published in March 2014 at http://
www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/SouthAfricaPhase3ReportEN.pdf, page 38, accessed
13 January 2015), its continued doubt about the independence and effective-
ness of the Hawks regarding the investigation of foreign bribery cases and
stated (at 41) that it remains ‘very concerned by the strikingly low level of
foreign bribery enforcement in SouthAfrica’.
From the outset the replacement of the Scorpions with the Hawks was
challenged by Mr Hugh Glenister and the Helen Suzman Foundation
(‘HSF’). In 2011 Glenister’s contention that the provisions of the SAPS Act
regulating the Hawks failed to secure ‘an adequate degree of independence’
for the Hawks and that they were therefore inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion, was upheld by a Constitutional Court in Glenister v President of the
Republic of South Africa & others 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) (‘Glenister II’). In that
case the bench was divided ﬁve to four. The court suspended the declaration
of constitutional invalidity in order to give Parliament the opportunity to
remedy the defect.
Following Parliament’s amendment of the SAPSAct in 2012, purportedly
to remove the constitutional shortcomings identiﬁed by the Constitutional
Court, Glenister and HSF approached the high court separately to impugn
the constitutional validity of the new version of the statute, with mixed
success. HSF applied to the Constitutional Court for conﬁrmation of their
successful application in the Western Cape High Court, appealed against the
part of the judgment in which they did not succeed, and Glenister appealed
against the same court’s striking out of the additional evidence he sought to
present, not declaring the entire legislative scheme of the 2012 amendments
to the SAPS Act unconstitutional, and the making of a punitive costs order.
The Constitutional Court dealt with these related cases jointly.
Various separate judgments were delivered. The majority consisted of six
justices out of a full bench of eleven, and in four separate minority judgments
points of partial agreement and disagreement were raised regarding the
constitutionality of the legislation and on the question whether Glenister’s
appeal should have succeeded or not.
The majority of the court rejected Glenister’s appeal, ﬁnding that the
Minister of Police’s constitutional oversight of national policing policy in
terms of ss 206(1) and 207(2) of the Constitution ‘accords with political
accountability which is not inimical to adequate independence’ (para 18). At
least three of the justices saw this issue in a fundamentally different way. This
reﬂects a difference in perceptions regarding the seriousness of the challenges
the country is facing. Despite the sharpness of the remarks of the majority on
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this aspect, the minority viewed the need to curb the executive’s interference
with the independence of the Hawks to be even more severe, and that it
justiﬁed a higher degree of judicial engagement.
The HSF’s application for the conﬁrmation of the high court’s ﬁndings of
constitutional invalidity in accordance with s 167(5) of the Constitution was
one of some eight issues dealt with by Mogoeng CJ. The high court had
found the (amended) provisions of the SAPS Act to be unconstitutional for
the following reasons:
(i) the appointment process of the head of the Hawks lacked sufﬁcient
criteria and vested, against international best practice, an unacceptable
degree of political control in the executive;
(ii) the Minister’s power to extend the terms of ofﬁce of the head and
deputy head of the Hawks did not warrant sufﬁcient independence;
(iii) the suspension and removal processes allowed for an inappropriate
measure of control by the Minister, and unacceptable procedures based
on arbitrary criteria; and
(iv) the degree of political oversight in the jurisdiction of the Hawks was
unacceptable and the provisions were embarrassingly vague.
The Western Cape High Court therefore declared ss 16(2)(h) and (3), 17A,
17CA, 17D, 17DA and 17K(4) to (9) of the SAPSAct unconstitutional. Due
to poor draftsmanship and the complexity of the amending patchwork that
was done on the text, determining the effect of various provisions of the
SAPS Act is a demanding task. Mogoeng CJ critically commented on this
feature of the Act in para 93 of his judgment, but did not conﬁrm all of the
high court’s ﬁndings on unconstitutionality.
The majority of the Constitutional Court concerned itself with the
following provisions of theAct:
(i) Section 16, dealing with the ‘national prevention and investigation of
crime’, more particularly ‘organised crime, crime which requires
national prevention or investigation, or crime which requires special-
ised skills in the prevention and investigation thereof’ (subsec (1)). This
provision appeared in the original version of the SAPS Act, but was
amended partially in 2008 when the Hawks were established, and again
in 2012 in consequence of the judgment in Glenister II.
(ii) Sections 16(2)(h) and (3) as amended in 2012, which both contained the
words ‘in accordance with the approved policy guidelines’. The ‘policy
guidelines’were those envisaged in s 17K(4) to (8), which was intended
to empower the Minister to ‘determine, with the concurrence of
Parliament’ policy guidelines for the selection, by the National Head of
the Hawks, of national priority offences and for the referral by the
National Commissioner of SAPS of offences for investigation by the
Hawks.
(iii) Section 17CA, inserted in 2012, which provided for the appointment of
the National Head of the Hawks for a non-renewable ﬁxed term
(subsec (1)(b)) of between seven and ten years. Although it is not
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expressly provided for, it may be assumed (as Mogoeng CJ did in para
78 of his judgment) that the National Head would be expected to retire
at the age of sixty. However, subsecs (15) and (16) purported to allow
the Minister to ‘retain’ the National Head beyond sixty, albeit for a
maximum of two years and with the incumbent’s concurrence.
(iv) Section 17DA(1) and (2), inserted in 2012, purported to provide for the
suspension and removal from ofﬁce of the Head of the Hawks by the
Minister.
(v) Section 17D(1)(aA), inserted in 2012, which provided that the func-
tions of the Hawks included the prevention, combating and investiga-
tion of ‘selected offences not limited to offences referred to in Chapter 2
and s 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12
of 2004’ (‘the CorruptionAct’). These provisions of the CorruptionAct
are focused on ‘offences in respect of corrupt activities’.
In his judgment for the majority, Mogoeng CJ focused on the question
whether the SAPS Act complied with ‘the constitutional obligation to
establish an adequately independent anti-corruption agency’, given the need
for the Hawks to ‘enjoy adequate structural and operational independence to
deliver effectively and efﬁciently on its core mandate’ (para 2 of the
judgment). In essence, the court found that some of the adjustments made to
theAct in 2012 failed to satisfy this need.
In contrast to the ﬁnding of the high court that the appointment criteria
and processes for the appointment of the Head of the Hawks were
unjustiﬁably broad and therefore constitutionally ﬂawed, the Constitutional
Court was satisﬁed that it was unnecessary to require the Head to have a legal
qualiﬁcation or to require more of the Minister than to report an appoint-
ment made with the concurrence of Cabinet to Parliament, as opposed to
submitting it to Parliament for approval (paras 63–76).
One of the incidental beneﬁts of the Chief Justice’s motivation for these
ﬁndings is a rare judicial explication of the meaning of the expression ‘ﬁt and
proper person’, which is often used as an appointment criterion, amongst
others, for judges and the admission of legal practitioners. In para 63 it was
stated that ‘ﬁt and proper’,
‘broadly speaking, means that the candidate must have the capacity to do the
job well and the character to match the importance of the ofﬁce. Experience,
integrity and conscientiousness are all intended to help determine a possible
appointee’s suitability ‘‘to be entrusted with the responsibilities of the ofﬁce
concerned’’. Similarly, laziness, dishonesty and general disorderliness must of
necessity disqualify a candidate.’
The Constitutional Court partially conﬁrmed the high court’s order relating
to the constitutional inconsistency of the impugned provisions but replaced it
with its own. The Chief Justice summarised the reasons for the order towards
the end of his judgment.
First, a key component of the order related to the manner in which the
SAPS Act dealt with the Hawks’ functions. The explanation of how this
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should be done was introduced by the following statement (in subpara (c) of
para 110 of the judgment):
‘South Africa needs a dedicated and better focused anti-corruption entity. A
clear identiﬁcation of the functions of the DPCI is therefore crucial. To achieve
that all-important objective, the segments of section 17D that are toxic to the
operational independence of the DPCI must be excised.’
Severance (in fact deletion, or as Mogoeng CJ put it in para 110(c)(i) of the
judgment, relieving the provision) of certain words in the errant statutory text,
was the chosen remedy. In order to clarify the Hawks’mandate and function,
words and phrases that purported to place the Minister in the position to
interfere in their activities were removed from section 17D(1)(a). The effect
of the severance is that the discretion to decide which ‘national priority
offences’ are to be prevented, combated and investigated by the Hawks lies
with their National Head and not with the Minister or the National
Commissioner of SAPS.
The severance of a few words from section 17D(1)(aA) causes the Act to
focus the work of the Hawks on offences in respect of corrupt activities, as is
intended in the CorruptionAct.
Secondly, the order ensured the complete removal of everything that
purported to ‘provide for the unbridled power to make ministerial policy
guidelines that touch at the heart of the DPCI’s operational independence’.
This involved ss 16(2)(h) and (3), 17CA(15) and (16), 17D(1)(a), and 17K(4),
(7) and (8).
Thirdly, the order addressed the empowerment of the Minister to ‘retain’
the Head beyond retirement age by severing subsecs 17CA(15) and (16) on
the following grounds:
‘They militate against independence by potentially birthing an illegitimate
hope in the belatedly-appointed National Head that a less assertive approach to
certain investigations might just enhance the prospects of renewal. The
certainty of retiring at 60 years of age however brightens the prospects of
adequate personal and institutional independence.’
Fourthly, and (as it emerged soon thereafter) signiﬁcantly, the procedures for
the suspension and removal of the Head of the Hawks provided for in
s 17DA were declared unconstitutional, since the power to suspend and
remove ‘vested exclusively in the Minister’, leaving ‘the performance-related
concerns . . . or alleged acts of misconduct’ intact in provisions ‘which are
more in sync with the legislative vision to create an adequately independent
anti-corruption unit whose National Head’s job security is entrenched’.
Froneman J and Cameron J concurred in the main judgment, except that
they would have allowed Glenister’s application for leave to appeal against
the dismissal of his application for the declaration of the entire legislative
scheme of the 2012 SAPS Amendment Act to be unconstitutional. They
were prepared to consider evidence and entertain argument to the effect that
the placement of the Hawks within SAPS was in itself unconstitutional and
in line with the court’s previous judgment in Glenister II (see also the separate
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judgment of Cameron J in which Froneman J and Van der Westhuizen J
concurred). Quoting the Chief Justice’s reference to the malady of corrup-
tion at the opening of the main judgment, Froneman J expressed his
agreement, and then went on to say (in paras 128 and 129):
‘But it does not follow that further probing into the possible extent of the
corruption is now a ‘‘closed chapter’’ and an issue that ‘‘was settled’’ in Glenister
II. What if the corruption is so ‘‘rife’’ that the very idea of locating the DPCI
within the SAPS — an otherwise perfectly acceptable option for ‘‘reasonable
decision-makers’’— becomes unthinkable because those controlling the SAPS
may themselves be part of the corruption?
The very idea that this situation might exist will be scandalous for our
country, but it does not mean that our courts are entitled to prevent concerned
persons from seeking to present evidence to sustain an assertion of that kind.’
Froneman J furthermore pointed out that the evidence that Glenister wished
to present relating, inter alia, to the ANC’s policy of ‘cadre deployment’, to
public political statements that the criminal justice system was ‘dysfunc-
tional’, and that courts’ striking down of unconstitutional legislation was an
interference of the judiciary with executive policy (paras 133–145 of the
judgment), should not have been struck out by the high court. In his separate
judgment Van der Westhuizen J added that, although constitutional law is
often ‘political’, and that the judiciary should not ‘play politics’, allowing
evidence on ‘cadre deployment’ would not have involved the court in
partisan politics. He said: ‘I am uncomfortable with evidence being labelled
as ‘‘political’’ as constituting a ground for its inadmissibility’ (para 205).
In his separate judgment, Cameron J referred to the OECD Report where
mention was made of the need that the selection process of the head of a
specialised anti-corruption institution ‘should be transparent and should
facilitate the appointment of a person of integrity on the basis of high-level
consensus among different power-holders’ (para 160). Referring to the high
court’s indication that the National Head’s appointment should be made
subject to parliamentary approval, Cameron J explained (paras 165–7):
‘This has many virtues. First, it dilutes the power possessed by any single
individual to appoint the Head he or she desires. Resonant with the separation
of powers, it attaches a signiﬁcant counterweight to the power of the Executive
and its members. Second, it spreads scrutiny of the appointment across the
political spectrum, ensuring that a diversity of political actors has a say —
including parties whose members, not being in government, will feel less
exposed to possible investigation.
This is no panacea, of course, especially since the votes of the ruling party’s
members may eventually be sufﬁcient to carry through the appointment. But
parliamentary involvement is salutary for a third reason. It is good for
transparency, public accountability and democracy. It forces the appointment
process out of the Executive’s impenetrably private deliberations into the fresh
light of the parliamentary chamber, whose proceedings are publicly accessible,
and where they are ripe for dissection and disputation by every person in the
country.
Our Constitution pointedly regards as a fundamental value not only
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universal adult suffrage but also ‘‘accountability, responsiveness and openness’’
of government.’
In her separate judgment, Nkabinde J also concurred in the main judgment,
except for the ﬁnding that neither the integrity testing measures that the
Minister may prescribe in terms of s 17E(8)(a) of the SAPS Act, nor the
remaining wide discretionary powers should pass muster. She implied in para
179 that the majority shied away from the task to test whether the statutory
provisions under scrutiny allowed for sufﬁcient independence of the Hawks
‘from undue political interference’. In his separate judgment, Van der
Westhuizen J did not agree with Nkabinde J on this point (para 196).
The judgment of the Constitutional Court was delivered on 27 Novem-
ber 2014. On 9 December 2014 the Minister of Police wrote to the
incumbent Head of the Hawks, Lieutenant-General Anwa Dramat, indicat-
ing that he was considering placing him on provisional suspension in terms of
s 17DA(2)(a)(i) of the SAPSAct because of his alleged role in the deportation
of Zimbabwean citizens in 2010 and 2011, which the Minister considered to
have been illegal (for the content of the Minister’s letter, see Helen Suzman
Foundation v Minister of Police [2015] ZAGPPHC 4 para 6).
In his response to the Minister, Dramat pointed out that s 17DA(2) of the
SAPS Act no longer applied since the Constitutional Court had declared it
unconstitutional. The Minister nevertheless informed Dramat in a letter
dated 23 December 2014 that he was placed ‘on precautionary suspension’,
insisting to be legally empowered to do so in terms of legislation relating to
the public service (ibid paras 8–10).
The Helen Suzman Foundation approached the Gauteng North High
Court, Pretoria, basing its standing on its own and the public’s interest (citing
Dramat as second respondent) and obtained an order declaring the Minister’s
decision to suspend Dramat (and to appoint an acting National Head in his
place) unlawful and invalid, and that the Minister did not have the power to
suspend him other than in terms of the remaining provisions of s 17DA.
These provisions require a two-thirds vote in the National Assembly
following an investigation by a parliamentary committee. Section 17DA(5)
however allows the Minister to suspend the Head
‘at any time after the start of the proceedings of a Committee of the National
Assembly for the removal of that person’.
On 29 January 2015 the Minister of Police requested the parliamentary
Portfolio Committee on Police ‘to initiate a process that will lead to the
removal of the head of HAWKS’. The Portfolio Committee decided to seek
the guidance of the Speaker of the National Assembly on the question
whether it, or an ad hoc committee, should deal with the matter (statement
by the chairperson of the Portfolio Committee dated 30 January 2015,
available at www.parliament.gov.za, accessed on 12 February 2015).
It does not require any speculation to conclude from the manner in which
Parliament and the Executive have been dealing, ﬁrst with the Scorpions
since 2008, and lately with the Hawks, that an agency mandated to deal with
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corruption independently, ie without political oversight, is a thorn in the
ﬂesh of the incumbent government. Such a conclusion is also supported by
various judicial observations in the judgments delivered by the Constitu-
tional Court on 27 November 2014. In the main judgment Mogoeng CJ for
example observed (para 107):
‘That the SAPS Act amendments under consideration are a consequence of
efforts meant to cure the constitutional defects identiﬁed by this Court in
Glenister II already, is in some respects regrettable. Regrettable having regard to
the apparent reluctance to strengthen the DPCI as directed by this Court, in
instances like the ministerial policy guidelines and renewability.’
Why the government does not wish to entrust efforts to stem the ﬂow of
corrupt activities to an independent agency is a burning question which
however cannot at this stage be answered satisfactorily from a legal point of
view. Nonetheless, the constitutional question that in my opinion arises
more urgently from the circumstances surrounding the evident undermining
by government of the operation of the Scorpions and the Hawks in their
efforts to ‘contain the malady of corruption’ is this: has the integrity of the
Constitution and the law lost the support of a government that is pursuing goals that do
not sit well with constitutionalism?
Posing this question and seeking an answer to it is more important than
transient political issues, however burning they may be. It goes to the heart of
the concern whether constitutionalism can survive under the apparent
offensive of an executive set on its dilution, if not its destruction, and if the
country is gradually being led along the road to authoritarian, patrimonial
rule under which even judicial correction may come to naught.
However these developments may further unfold, one may be grateful
that the courts have shown their determination to uphold and promote
constitutionalism, albeit not always from a consolidated perspective. Their
efforts in this regard deserve the full support of the legal community, which
should at the same time be wary of all attempts to undermine its own
independence.
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INTRODUCTION
The proposed reforms to ﬁnancial regulation in South Africa, as embodied
in the Financial Sector Regulation Bill, (second draft, 10 December 2014)
(‘the FSR Bill’), available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/
FSR2014/2014%2012%2011%20FSRB%20including%20Consequential%
20Amendments%20and%20Memo%20of%20Objects.pdf ), represent the most
important reforms to SouthAfrica’s ﬁnancial regulatory architecture since the
1987 De Kock Commission. The degree to which these reforms succeed will
determine the extent to which South Africa can maintain ﬁnancial stability,
and manage the effects of a future ﬁnancial crisis.
The De Kock Commission’s ﬁndings led to the creation of the Financial
Rand, and a dual exchange rate system for South Africa (Pieter Cornelis Smit
Economics: A Southern African Perspective (1996) 421). The current proposed
reforms introduce two regulators for the Republic’s ﬁnancial sector — a
so-called ‘Twin Peaks’ regulatory model: a Prudential Authority, which ‘will
supervise the safety and soundness of banks, insurance companies and other
ﬁnancial institutions’, and a Financial Sector Conduct Authority, which ‘will
supervise how ﬁnancial services ﬁrms conduct their business and treat
customers’ (National Treasury Media Statement ‘TWIN PEAKS: Second
draft of Financial Sector Regulation Bill and draft Market Conduct Policy
Framework discussion document published for comment’ (11 December
2014)). This model was ﬁrst adopted by Australia, and the South African
authorities have drawn on the Australian experience (National Treasury
Media Statement ‘A safer ﬁnancial sector to serve South Africa better’
(23 February 2011) 28–9 and 40; Financial Regulatory Reform Steering
Committee ‘Implementing a twin peaks model of ﬁnancial regulation in
South Africa’ (1 February 2013) 22–3; Bryane Michael ‘The ‘‘Twin Peaks’’
regulatory model: The future of ﬁnancial regulation?’ (March–April 2014)
Banking Today 3–4).
What follows is an analysis of the South African iteration of the model, and
where and how it differs from the Australian model in certain respects,
* The research for this essay was supported with funds from Melbourne Law
School and the Centre for International Finance and Regulation (Project 018).
Amongst other things, it draws upon comments submitted by the authors to the
National Treasury of SouthAfrica in respect of the Financial Sector Regulation Bill.
(2015) 132 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL756
JOBNAME: SALJ 15 Part4 PAGE: 47 SESS: 33 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 17 13:15:30 2015
/first/Juta/juta/SALJ−2015−Part4/00notes
including the inter-agency co-ordination arrangements, and the extent to
which the FSR Bill adequately creates the conditions for such co-ordination.
Importantly, the FSR Bill expressly recognises that the purpose of the
legislation is to ‘maintain and enhance ﬁnancial stability’, and that its object is
‘to achieve a ﬁnancial system that works in the interests of ﬁnancial
customers, and supports balanced and sustainable economic growth in the
Republic’ (FSR Bill, Preamble and s 6, headed ‘Object of this Act’).
The impact of a ﬁnancial crisis can be catastrophic, as the Global Financial
Crisis so amply demonstrated. It led to the closure of venerated ﬁnancial
ﬁrms such as Lehman Brothers (Phillip Swagel ‘The ﬁnancial crisis: An inside
view’ (Spring 2009) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity at 1, 2, 5 and 8) and
disrupted ﬁnancial markets (and relationships) around the world (Massimil-
iano Cali, Isabella Massa & Dirk Willem te Velde ‘The Global Financial
Crisis: Financial ﬂows to developing countries set to fall by one quarter’
(13 November 2008) Research Reports and Studies 1; Claes Norgren ‘The
causes of the Global Financial Crisis and their implications for supreme audit
institutions’ INTOSAI Report (2010) 8[49]; Guy Debelle ‘Some effects of the
Global Financial Crisis on Australian ﬁnancial markets’ (31 March, 2009)
Finance Professionals Forum). At one stage during the Global Financial Crisis,
UK authorities activated anti-terrorism powers against Iceland’s banks
(invoking s 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001; see
further Timothy Edmonds, ‘Icelandic bank default’ Publications & Records,
Briefing Papers (21 July 2009) 13; ‘Terror law used for Iceland deposits’ The
Financial Times 8 October 2008). Iceland in turn faced either the loss of
currency sovereignty or default on their foreign debt (Már Guðmundsson
‘Iceland’s crisis and recovery and current challenges’ unpublished paper
presented at a conference organised by the French-Icelandic Chamber of
Commerce; Islande, La Renaissance, 2013). By comparison, Greece chose
default (Richard M Salsman ‘Greece’s disgraceful debt default — and calls to
‘‘euthanize’’ bondholders’ Forbes 20 March, 2012 at 1).
The Bill’s focus on ﬁnancial stability is supported by a deﬁnition of
‘ﬁnancial stability’. Section 4 provides that
‘there is said to be ‘‘ﬁnancial stability’’ ’ if:
(a) ﬁnancial institutions generally provide ﬁnancial products and ﬁnancial
services without interruption and are capable of continuing to do so; and
(b) there is general conﬁdence in their ability to continue to do so.’
Section 8 of the Bill provides for the functions of the South African Reserve
Bank (‘SARB’) in relation to ﬁnancial stability, and the method by which
ﬁnancial stability should be restored or maintained in the event of a systemic
event. The deﬁnition of ‘systemic event’ is provided in s 1 of the Bill and
serves as a counterpart to the deﬁnition of ‘ﬁnancial stability’ in so far as it
relates to the inability of a ﬁnancial institution or a group of ﬁnancial
institutions ‘to provide ﬁnancial products and ﬁnancial services’ or ‘a general
failure of conﬁdence of ﬁnancial customers in the ability of one or more
ﬁnancial institutions to continue to provide ﬁnancial products or services’.
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Central to the ‘Twin Peaks’ model in South Africa is the creation of two
regulators, namely the Prudential Authority (Chapter 3 of the Bill) and the
Financial Sector Conduct Authority (Chapter 4 of the Bill). Each authority
will be a juristic person; however, the Prudential Authority will be housed
within the South African Reserve Bank (‘SARB’) and will operate ‘within
the administration of the Reserve Bank’ (s 27(1)). Under s 46 of the FSR
Bill, ‘[t]he Reserve Bank must provide the Prudential Authority with the
personnel, accommodation, facilities, the use of assets and other services and
resources that are determined in accordance with section 45(1).’
There are many elements that underpin the effectiveness of the ‘Twin
Peaks’ system of ﬁnancial regulation, under which there are separate
regulators for prudential supervision and market conduct. These include a
clear allocation of objectives and responsibilities between each regulator;
effective co-ordination between the regulators; transparency and account-
ability on the part of each regulator; effective powers of supervision and
enforcement; operational independence of each regulator (vis-à-vis the
executive government); a sound governance system and adequate resources
(Michael W Taylor ‘ ‘‘Twin Peaks’’: A regulatory structure for the new
century’ Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation Report, December
1995 at 1–3; MichaelWTaylor ‘The road from ‘‘Twin Peaks’’— and the way
back’ (2009–2010) 16 Connecticut Insurance LJ 64; Michael W Taylor
‘Regulatory reform after the ﬁnancial crisis — Twin Peaks revisited’ Lecture
delivered at the Law and Finance Senior Practitioner Lecture Series, Oxford
University, 16 February, 2011, available at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/events/
regulatory-reform-after-financial-crisis-twin-peaks-revisited). Most (if not all) of
these elements form part of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ‘Core Principles
for Effective Banking Supervision’ (September 2012) available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.htm).
This note will focus on three fundamental questions by reference to the
experience and current debate in Australia, which has recently undergone a
comprehensive review of the ﬁnancial system, known as the Financial
System Inquiry (‘FSI’) (Financial System Inquiry ‘Financial System Inquiry
Final Report’ (November 2014)). The FSI has generated debate around a
number of fundamental issues, including the nature and structure of the
system of ﬁnancial regulation in Australia. The questions that arise for South
Africa are as follows: (1) what are the implications of housing the prudential
regulator within the National Central Bank (‘NCB’)? (2) How should
effective co-ordination between the regulators be achieved? (3) What
substantive functions and powers should an inter-agency co-ordinating body
have?
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF HOUSING THE PRUDEN-
TIAL REGULATOR WITHIN THE NATIONAL CENTRAL BANK?
It is noteworthy that in Australia the prudential regulator, the Australian
Prudential Regulation Authority (‘APRA’) (created pursuant to the Austra-
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lian Prudential Regulation Authority Act (Cth), (1998)), is separate from the
Reserve Bank ofAustralia, and is an independent statutory authority, as is the
market conduct regulator, theAustralian Securities and Investment Commis-
sion (‘ASIC’) (created pursuant to the Australian Securities and Investments
CommissionAct (Cth), (2001)).
In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the Prudential Regulation
Authority is part of the Bank of England, and is a limited liability company,
wholly owned by the Bank of England. Its relationship with the Bank of
England is regulated by Schedule 1ZB of the Financial Services Act, 2012.
Various arguments have been made for and against each approach. In our
view, the weight of opinion (theoretically at least) is in favour of a
stand-alone regulator that is independent of the NCB, provided that
adequate co-ordination is achieved between the regulators (namely, the
market conduct regulator and the prudential regulator) and also between
each regulator and the NCB. (See for example Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio
di Giorgio ‘Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given
to different agencies?’ (November 1999) International Finance 361 at 372–6;
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision op cit § 41 p 10; Charles Goodhart
& Dirk Schoenmaker ‘Institutional separation between supervisory and
monetary agencies’, (October–December 1992) 51 Giornale degli economisti e
annali di economia 361; H Robert Heller ‘Prudential supervision and mone-
tary policy’ International Financial Policy: Essays in Honour of Jacques J Polak
(1991) 5; Vasso P Ioannidou ‘Does monetary policy affect the central bank’s
role in bank supervision?’ (2005) 14 Journal of Financial Intermediation 60; José
Tuya & Lorena Zamalloa ‘Issues on placing banking supervision in the
Central Bank’ in Frameworks for Monetary Stability: Policy Issues and Country
Experiences. Papers presented at the sixth Seminar on Central Banking, Washington
DC, March 1994 (1994) 680).
The arguments in favour of a stand-alone prudential regulator relate,
principally, to conﬂicts of interest and operational independence. From an
economics and ﬁnance perspective, Goodhart & Shoenmaker op cit at 361
have observed that a conﬂict of interest
‘may arise between the monetary authorities, who wish for higher rates . . . ,
and the regulatory authorities who are frightened about the adverse effects such
higher rates may have upon the bad debts, proﬁtability, capital adequacy and
solvency of the banking system’.
Under the FSR Bill, the Reserve Bank must deal with similarly competing
priorities. Section 12 provides that when the Reserve Bank acts to prevent or
manage a systemic risk, it must have due regard to various needs, including
the need to ‘protect and maintain ﬁnancial stability’, which may involve the
continuing provision of ﬁnancial products and ﬁnancial services by ﬁnancial
institutions, the need to ‘protect, as appropriate, ﬁnancial customers’ and the
need to ‘contain the cost to the Republic of the systemic event and the
measures taken to manage it’.
An assessment of these factors may involve competing priorities and give
rise to potential conﬂicts of interest. For example, the costs of a systemic
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event could potentially be lower in the event that a bank is deemed to have
failed, and should exit. However, a bank exit policy may conﬂict with the
goal of protecting ﬁnancial customers where the bank in question is
designated as a systemically important ﬁnancial institution, and should
therefore continue to provide ﬁnancial products and ﬁnancial services. Such
circumstances may create challenges in terms of determining which priority
should prevail.
Along similar lines, Ioannidou op cit at 60 has asserted that
‘when the Fed tightens monetary policy, it becomes less strict in bank
supervision (ie, an increase in interest rates or a decrease in reserves is associated
with a lower probability of intervention). One possible explanation is that the
Fed tends to be less strict on bank supervision in order to compensate banks for
the extra pressure it puts on them when it tightens monetary policy. The Fed
might be interested in compensating troubled banks either because it is
concerned about possible adverse effects from bank failures on its reputation or
because it is concerned about possible knock-on effects. After all, the Fed is
responsible for maintaining the stability of the ﬁnancial system and it is
responsible for the supervision of some of the biggest banks in the United
States.’
There is also evidence that an independent regulator leads to better
macro-economic outcomes, such as lower average inﬂation (Di Noia & Di
Giorgio op cit at 361–72) and, further, that an independent prudential
regulatory authority correlates to a more competitive banking system (ibid at
373).
From a regulatory perspective, an independent regulator comports more
closely with the Basel Committee Principles on Banking Supervision, in
particular principle 2, which states as follows:
‘Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for supervisors:
The supervisor possesses operational independence, transparent processes,
sound governance, budgetary processes that do not undermine autonomy and
adequate resources, and is accountable for the discharge of its duties and use of
its resources. The legal framework for banking supervision includes legal
protection for the supervisor.’
Conversely, and from a practical perspective, there are beneﬁts in housing
the prudential regulator within the NCB. These include the ability to
achieve synergies in relation to resources and expertise, and to avoid the
difﬁculties that arise in relation to information-sharing that do not present
where the central bank and the prudential regulator are one organisation. In
addition, in jurisdictions that do not have a tradition of independent
regulatory agencies, but do have a tradition of a strongly independent central
bank, housing the prudential regulator within the NCB may ensure that it
operates independently of government.Anecdotal evidence suggests that this
was a factor behind the proposed reforms in SouthAfrica.
In Australia, the prudential regulator, APRA, was established as a stand-
alone regulator on 1 July 1998 in response to the recommendations of the
1996 Financial System Inquiry, known as the Wallis Inquiry. This was
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established to examine the Australian ﬁnancial system and led, ultimately, to
the adoption of the ‘Twin Peaks’ model in Australia (Stan Wallis, Bill
Beerworth, Jeffrey Carmichael, Ian Harper & Linda Nicholls Financial System
Inquiry Final Report (1997) 20). Its ability to perform its role effectively from
the outset was attributable, in part, to the movement of personnel to APRA
from the Reserve Bank of Australia (‘RBA’). This ensured that APRA had
the necessary expertise for its functions, and also provided a ﬁrm basis for
co-ordination and co-operation between APRA and the RBA. Empirical
research suggests that there is general consensus among the regulators and the
RBA in support of APRA’s stand-alone status (interviews withASIC, APRA
and the RBAconducted by the authors in July 2014), and that such support is
reﬂected in the business community more broadly. For example, the
submission by KPMG to the FSI, commenced inAustralia at the end of 2013,
stated that ‘KPMG is inclined to view the current model — with APRA
remaining a separate authority focused on prudential supervision – [as] the
better arrangement’ (Adrian Fisk & Ian Pollari ‘Financial system inquiry,
KPMG submission’ (March 2014) Financial Services 6). This, KPMG sug-
gested, was due to its ‘cultural traits’, knowledge and experience, as well as
the risk of conﬂicts of interest that would arise if APRA were merged with
the RBA (ibid).
The regulatory design in any country has to accommodate the speciﬁc
circumstances and needs of that country. In South Africa, there are likely to
be cogent reasons for housing the PrudentialAuthority within the SARB. To
some extent, the FSR Bill overcomes some of the concerns that are identiﬁed
above, by clearly stipulating the objectives and internal governance structures
of the Prudential Authority. However, it will still be necessary to ensure that
the Prudential Authority achieves an appropriate level of operational inde-
pendence in practice, and that the risks of conﬂicts of interest and competing
priorities, as referred to above, are appropriately managed.
HOW SHOULD EFFECTIVE CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE
REGULATORS BE ACHIEVED?
Regulatory co-ordination — soft law vs hard law
Much has been written about soft law in the context of regulation, and its
relative merits, as compared with hard law. For example, it has been said that
regulators turn to soft law in ﬁnancial regulation because of the ‘sociological
pull of soft law venues’, the fact that soft law is ‘quicker, cheaper and more
ﬂexible’ and also that it is non-binding in nature, all of which ‘appeals to
fast-moving regulators who need to try things out’ (Claire R Kelly ‘The
sociological pull of soft law’ (2012) 106 American Society of International Law
Proceedings 327). Soft law is often embodied in memoranda of understanding
between the regulatory agencies. As Ferran &Alexander state (Ellis Ferran &
KernAlexander ‘Can soft law bodies be effective? Soft systemic risk oversight
bodies and the special case of the European Systemic Risk Board’, (June
2011) Legal Studies Research Paper Series 6):
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‘Hard law ordinarily gives rise to enforceable obligations and therefore has to be
reasonably certain and predictable so that people can determine what is
expected of them. Soft law, not being directly enforceable, can be more
open-textured.’
In Australia, the legislative framework for regulatory co-ordination is high
level and outcomes focused. Although there is a general reference to
co-ordination in the legislation governing APRA, there are no detailed
provisions as to the nature of co-ordination and how it should be achieved.
Instead, s10Aof theAPRAAct provides in general terms as follows:
‘(1) The Parliament intends that APRA should, in performing and exercising
its functions and powers, have regard to the desirability of APRA
cooperating with other ﬁnancial sector supervisory agencies, and with
other agencies speciﬁed in regulations for the purposes of this subsection.
(2) This section does not override any restrictions that would otherwise apply
to APRA or confer any powers on APRA that it would not otherwise
have.’
This provision was added to implement recommendations handed down by
the HIH Royal Commission (The HIH Royal Commission ‘Report of the
HIH Royal Commission’ (April 2003)) ‘on liaison and co-ordination with
both domestic and international regulators and other agencies’ (see the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Amendment Act (Cth) (2003),
Explanatory Memorandum).
This process relies substantially on ‘soft-law’ mechanisms in the form of
memoranda of understanding and informal protocols between the regulators,
where the legislative framework is more facilitative, or enabling, than
prescriptive. Overseeing the process is the Council of Financial Regulators
(‘CFR’), which ‘operates as a high-level forum for co-operation and
collaboration among its members’ (The Council of Financial Regulators,
‘Memorandum of understanding on ﬁnancial distress management between
the members of the Council of Financial Regulators’ (September 2008)).
The soft-law approach in Australia is reﬂected in the fact that neither the
CFR, nor the form or content of the regulatory memoranda of understand-
ing, is prescribed by statute.
The soft-law approach was also underscored in the Interim Report of the
Australian Financial System Inquiry, which drew on the submission of the
RBA in stating that ‘[l]egislation cannot be relied on to promote a culture of
cooperation, trust and mutual support between domestic regulatory agen-
cies. These have been highlighted as essential elements of an effective
ﬁnancial stability framework, especially during a crisis’ (Financial System
Inquiry ‘Financial System Inquiry interim report’ (July 2014) 3–119). Of
greater importance to the regulators in Australia, the RBA has suggested, is
cultivating a culture of co-ordination, under which the main focus is on
regulatory performance, rather than regulatory structure. The Assistant
Governor (Financial) of the RBAhas attributed the efﬁcacy of co-ordination
between the regulators inAustralia to a culture
‘where we regard cooperation with the other agencies as an important part of
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our job, and there is a strong expectation from the public and the government
that we will continue to do so. . . . Key aspects [of coordination] include an
effective ﬂow of information across staff in the market operations and
macroeconomic departments of a central bank and those working in the areas
of ﬁnancial stability and bank supervision. Regular meetings among these
groups to focus on risks and vulnerabilities and to highlight warning signs can
be very valuable. A culture of coordination among these areas is very important
in a crisis because, in many instances, a stress situation is ﬁrst evident in liquidity
strains visible to the central bank, and the ﬁrst responses may be calls on central
bank liquidity.’ (Malcom Edey ‘Macroprudential supervision and the role of
central banks’ (September 2012) at 3. Paper presented at the Regional Policy
Forum on Financial Stability and Macroprudential Supervision Hosted by the
Financial Stability Institute and the China Banking Regulatory Commission.)
The soft-law approach to regulatory co-ordination in Australia can be
contrasted with the more prescriptive ‘hard-law’ approach to regulatory
co-ordination adopted in the United Kingdom as set out below, and the
proposed approach in South Africa, as set out in chap 6 of the FSR Bill,
particularly in ss 76 and 77. Indeed, the preamble to the Bill provides
expressly that one of its objects is ‘to provide for co-ordination,
co-operation, collaboration, consultation and consistency’ between the
regulatory authorities. In particular, the South African model borrows from
the UK model in terms of prescribing the nature of co-ordination between
the regulators, and imposing a statutory duty on the regulators to co-operate
or co-ordinate their activities (the FSR Bill, s 76). This can be contrasted
with Australia, where, although co-operation is referred to in the legislation
governing APRA, there are no detailed provisions as to the nature of
co-operation and how it should be achieved (APRAAct, s 10A).
In the UK, s 3D of the Financial ServicesAct, 2012 provides as follows:
‘(1) The regulators must co-ordinate the exercise of their respective functions
conferred by or under thisAct with a view to ensuring —
(a) that each regulator consults the other regulator (where not otherwise
required to do so) in connection with any proposed exercise of a
function in a way that may have a material adverse effect on the
advancement by the other regulator of any of its objectives;
(b) that where appropriate each regulator obtains information and advice
from the other regulator in connection with the exercise of its
functions in relation to matters of common regulatory interest in
cases where the other regulator may be expected to have relevant
information or relevant expertise; . . .’
This duty is qualiﬁed under s 3(2):
‘(2) The duty in subsection (1) applies only to the extent that compliance with
the duty —
(a) is compatible with the advancement by each regulator of any of its
objectives; and
(b) does not impose a burden on the regulators that is disproportionate
to the beneﬁts of compliance.’
This approach ﬁnds parallels in s 76(1) of the FSR Bill, which provides:
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‘The ﬁnancial sector regulators and the Reserve Bank must co-ordinate,
co-operate, collaborate and consult with each other in relation to performing
their functions in terms of thisAct and the other ﬁnancial sector laws.’
Under s 76(2)(b), (c) and (f), the duty to co-ordinate includes the requirement
to ‘inform each other about, and share information about, matters of
common interest’ (unlike the legislation in the UK (see Financial Services
Act, 2012, s 3D(3)), the FSR Bill does not expressly deﬁne ‘matters of
common interest’, although various examples are provided in certain
sections), ‘coordinate their actions to the extent that is appropriate and
practicable’ and ‘interact with each other in relation to strategic directions
and understandings of national and international regulatory challenges’.
There is no direct equivalent to s 3D(2) of the UK legislation.
Regulatory memoranda of understanding
The FSR Bill makes provision for a regulatory memorandum of understand-
ing to be entered into by the regulatory authorities (see the FSR Bill, s 77).
This will deal with various matters, including how the regulators and the
Reserve Bank will comply with their duties to co-ordinate in practice,
delegation of powers between the Prudential Authority and the Financial
Sector Conduct Authority and how differences between them are to be
resolved. In Australia, the understanding is that the memoranda of under-
standing between the regulators and between each regulator and the RBA
are not legally binding. This would appear to be the case under the FSR Bill.
Arguably, the hard-law nature of regulatory co-ordination in SouthAfrica,
which involves a statutory duty to co-operate, raises various concerns,
including whether this approach will result in inﬂexibility (namely, an
inability to adapt to circumstances as and when they arise), and a culture that
is more concerned with compliance than in achieving appropriate outcomes.
Our ﬁndings, derived from interviews conducted with the regulators in
Australia, suggest that a ﬂexible approach to co-ordination, able to adapt to
the circumstances, enabled the Australian regulators to deal effectively with
the challenges arising out of the Global Financial Crisis and the 2010
Sovereign Debt Crisis. It was evident that over-prescription, or formalisa-
tion, would have stiﬂed this ﬂexibility.
Some ﬂexibility to managing crises or systemic events is achieved in
s 12(3) of the FSR Bill, which provides that the Governor of the Reserve
Bank ‘may establish a management committee, consisting of senior represen-
tatives of the Reserve Bank, the ﬁnancial sector regulators and other relevant
organs of state, to assist with co-ordinating activities to manage a systemic
event referred to in subsection 1(b) and its effects’.
Empirical evidence suggests that the experience in Australia is that the
memoranda of understanding do not have any practical effect or utility in
terms of achieving the relevant outcomes, and that neither ASIC nor APRA
relies strictly on the letter of the memoranda of understanding. Instead, the
main value of the memoranda is in signalling to the public how the regulators
intend to achieve effective co-ordination, and also the process by which they
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are reviewed from time to time (interviews conducted with the regulators by
the authors in July 2014). The FSR Bill provides in s 77(3) that ‘[t]he
ﬁnancial sector regulators and the Reserve Bank must review and update the
memoranda of understanding as appropriate, but at least once every three
years.’ In the UK, s 3E(4) the Financial Services Act, 2012 provides that the
memorandum of understanding between the regulators must be reviewed at
least once in each calendar year.
WHAT SUBSTANTIVE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS SHOULD AN
INTER-AGENCY CO-ORDINATING BODY HAVE?
The South African model borrows from the Australian model in terms of
establishing a Council of Financial Regulators (‘CFR’), a body that has no
equivalent in the UK. An interesting difference between South Africa and
Australia, however, is that the CFR will have a statutory basis under the FSR
Bill, whereas the CFR has no statutory basis in Australia, reﬂecting the
soft-law approach we noted above. In addition, the CFR inAustralia ‘has no
legal functions or powers separate from those of its individual member
agencies’ (The Council of Financial Regulators ‘About the CFR’ (2013–
2014), available at http://www.cfr.gov.au/about-cfr/index.html/). The question
whether the CFR should have a statutory basis has been the subject of recent
debate in Australia in the context of the FSI, including whether greater
transparency and accountability should be introduced into the regulatory
system inAustralia.
As the RBA outlined in its submission to the Financial System Inquiry
(FSI) (Reserve Bank of Australia ‘Submission to the Financial System
Inquiry’ (March 2014) 66):
‘The CFR is the coordinating body for Australia’s main ﬁnancial regulatory
agencies. Its membership comprisesAPRA,ASIC, theRBAand theTreasury.The
CFR was established in 1998 following the recommendations of the previous
Financial System Inquiry (the Wallis Inquiry). It is a non-statutory interagency
body, and has no regulatory functions separate from those of its fourmembers.
CFR meetings are chaired by the Reserve Bank Governor, with secretariat
support provided by the RBA. They are typically held four times per year but
can occur more frequently if required. As stated in the CFR Charter, the
meetings provide a forum for:
• identifying important issues and trends in the ﬁnancial system, including
those that may impinge upon overall ﬁnancial stability;
• ensuring the existence of appropriate coordination arrangements for
responding to actual or potential instances of ﬁnancial instability, and
helping to resolve any issues where members’ responsibilities overlap; and
• harmonising regulatory and reporting requirements, paying close attention
to the need to keep regulatory costs to a minimum. . . .
Much of the input into CFR meetings is undertaken by interagency working
groups, which has the additional beneﬁt of promoting productive working
relationships and an appreciation of cross-agency issues at the staff level.
The CFR has worked well since its establishment and, during the crisis in
particular, it has proven to be an effective means of coordinating responses to
potential threats to ﬁnancial stability. . . .
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The experience since its establishment, and especially during the crisis, has
highlighted the beneﬁts of the existing non-statutory basis of the CFR.’
By contrast, section 79(2) of the FSR Bill makes provision for the operation
and responsibilities of the CFR, stating that its function is to ‘facilitate
co-ordination, co-operation, collaboration, consultation and consistency, by
allowing senior ofﬁcers of its constituent institutions to discuss and inform
themselves about matters of common interest, including strategic directions
to be adopted, and understanding and meeting international and domestic
regulatory challenges’. Membership of the CFR includes representatives
from the regulatory authorities and certain departments, and the heads of any
organ of state or other organisation that the Minister determines.
The open-ended nature of the membership of the proposed CFR in South
Africa raises some queries and provides an interesting contrast with the
approach inAustralia, where the membership is limited toAPRA,ASIC, the
RBA and the Treasury. It should be noted, however, that submissions to the
FSI had called for the membership in Australia to be extended to other
regulatory agencies (see for example, the submissions of the Commonwealth
Bank of Australia, ‘Wellbeing, resilience and prosperity for Australia, Finan-
cial System Inquiry’ (March 2014) 88, and Fisk & Pollari op cit at 4).
However, this recommendation was not subsequently accepted in the FSI
Final Report. The FSR Bill further provides that meetings of the Council
must be held at least twice a year (FSR Bill, s 80(1)). By contrast, the
expectation in Australia is that the Council will meet at least four times each
year, and that the Council will include working groups and subcommittees
in areas such as enforcement, legislation, standard-setting and ﬁnancial
inclusion (FSR Bill, s 81).
As we have noted above, the FSR Bill makes a general provision for the
CFR.As yet, there is no indication as to what, if any, substantive powers and
functions it will have. Two questions arise in this regard: (1) should the
Council have substantive powers and functions that go beyond its consulta-
tive and co-ordinating role? and (2) how should accountability and trans-
parency be achieved?
These two questions were the subject of submissions to the FSI inAustralia
and various stakeholders suggested that the role and functions of the Council
of Financial Regulators should be enshrined in statute. For example, KPMG
submitted that the Council’s ‘role, transparency and accountability would be
strengthened if it were given statutory recognition’ (Fisk & Pollari op cit at
5). In addition, the National Australia Bank recommended that ‘the Council
of Financial Regulators (CFR) should be given a more formal structure and
be tasked by the Treasurer to coordinate the implementation of regulatory
change by APRA and ASIC’ (National Australia Bank ‘NAB Submission to
the Financial System Inquiry’ (March 2014) § 3.2.2, p 4).
One concern in having a statutory-based inter-agency co-ordinating body
is that it might be treated as the only channel through which inter-agency
co-ordination can be achieved. In this regard, it is relevant to note that
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s 79(4) of the FSR Bill provides that ‘[t]his section does not limit the powers
or duties of the Council of Financial Regulators’ constituent institutions,
including other powers and duties in relation to consultation, co-operation
and co-ordination’.
A further concern, which was expressed by the RBA in its submission to
the FSI, is that ‘formalising the CFR with explicit responsibilities and policy
tools would involve transferring agency constituent powers to the CFR,
with the risk of blurring lines of responsibility that to date have worked well’
(Reserve Bank of Australia ‘Submission to the Financial System Inquiry’,
(March 2014) 67). In other words, conferring explicit powers and responsi-
bilities on the CFR that go beyond its consultative and co-ordinating role
might cut across the powers and responsibilities of the member agencies. A
better approach, it has been suggested, is for the Council of Financial
Regulators to be ‘seen as the collaborative dimension of the regulatory
agencies’ activities, rather than as a separate body with its own ability to make
the regulatory agencies cooperate’ (Financial System Inquiry ‘Financial
System Inquiry Interim Report’ op cit at 3–119). This is consistent with the
approach of one of the regulators, expressed during interviews conducted by
the authors, that giving formal co-ordination powers to the CFR may
confuse accountability and require a more intrusive infrastructure, and that
the system in Australia works well without one body directing the process.
Further, what is critical to regulatory co-ordination is, at a formal level, the
regular meetings of the Council of Financial Regulators and its working
committees and, at an informal level, the relationship between the people
involved (interviews with the regulators in July 2014).
In its submission, the RBA noted that although formal structures for
co-ordination between agencies might assist to mediate the resolution of
differences between regulatory agencies, and thereby enforce outcomes, ‘it is
unclear how reassigning part of a regulatory agency’s constituent powers to
an overarching body will inﬂuence coordination and effectiveness of
regulatory policies. Similarly, it remains to be seen if formality is the feature
of institutional arrangements that ensures better outcomes’ (Reserve Bank of
Australia ‘Submission to the Financial System Inquiry’op cit at 53).
Underlying this reservation, it is suggested, is a concern that formalising
the role of the CFR and the inter-agency co-ordinating arrangements might
distract from the ﬂexibility and robustness required to make co-ordination
work; namely, it might result in a situation where the regulators involved are
more concerned about complying — and being seen to comply — with the
formal requirements, than they are about regulatory performance and
achieving the desired outcomes. This may have been one of the reasons why
the FSI Final Report did not recommend any fundamental change to the
current institutional arrangements. The approach in Australia appears to be
reﬂected in the approach in South Africa, where the Council of Financial
Regulators has a facilitative function and is not granted express powers that
might cut across the powers and responsibilities of its members.
One area in which there has been some limited development in Australia
in relation to the CFR is increased transparency in the form of a webpage for
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the CFR on the website of the Australian Commonwealth Treasury (The
Council of Financial Regulators ‘Welcome to the Council of Financial
Regulators’ (2013–2014), available at www.cfr.au/). The webpage contains
information about the Council, media releases, publications and other
resources. This is in line with the views expressed in the FSI Final Report
that ‘there would be beneﬁt in increasing the transparency of the CFR’s
deliberations, including its assessment of ﬁnancial stability risks and how
these are being addressed’. To date, however, the minutes of the meetings of
the CFR have not been published. By contrast, s 57(2)(b) of the ﬁrst draft of
the FSR Bill provided for a higher level of transparency, by stipulating that
the meetings of the CFR ‘must be published on the National Treasury’s
website for public information, unless the decision involves conﬁdential
information’. This provision was not carried over into the second draft of the
FSR Bill.
CONCLUSION
The move in South Africa towards a ‘Twin Peaks’ model of ﬁnancial
regulation is a signiﬁcant reform that should promote ﬁnancial stability and
strengthen South Africa’s ability to manage and mitigate the effects of
ﬁnancial crises. The experience of Australia provides some insights into the
challenges that this model presents, particularly in the area of regulatory
co-ordination, and the various ways in which these challenges might be
overcome. One of the key lessons suggested by the Australian experience is
that the legislative and regulatory framework is a necessary — but, of itself,
insufﬁcient — element in terms of achieving the desired outcomes. Of equal
importance is a ‘culture of co-ordination’ under which the main focus is on
regulatory performance rather than regulatory structure. In this regard, the
high-level, outcomes-focused and ‘soft-law’ approach adopted in Australia
offers an interesting contrast to the more prescriptive ‘hard-law’ approach in
the United Kingdom, and the proposed approach in SouthAfrica. Of critical
importance, this note suggests, is achieving an appropriate balance between
formality and ﬂexibility; namely, making clear provision for the nature and
scope of regulatory co-ordination while at the same time ensuring that the
system is sufﬁciently ﬂexible to allow it to adapt to speciﬁc circumstances, as
and when they arise.
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